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# Imperial Intervention K – Preinstitute

## 1NC Shell

**The affirmative’s depiction of Latin America identifies the US acting upon a passive country framed around depictions of poor economics, drugs, or chaos. This threatening frame secures a violent relationship between the actors**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

I want to argue that Latin America is invisible to IR, and that taking the region seriously unsettles the discipline in two key ways, especially if we embrace an explicitly Latin American postcolonial perspective. Firstly, it places early colonial and slave experiences at the heart of international relationships. This questions IR’s enduring emphasis on state sovereignty and inter-state war by foregrounding what I call inter-polity relationships and recognising inter-polity struggles. Secondly, reading IR through Latin America – from the south-side up – gives us a different perspective on the USA, one which reveals its coloniality in the past, and (more importantly) in the present. I argue that the very special relationship between Latin America and the USA, so often understood as being simply imperialistic, might be thought of as a complex mix in which Latin America is both different and the same, both ‘other’ and ‘akin’. Recognising this complex relationship opens new ways of thinking about the region – and international relations. ¶ It is intriguing that International Relations hardly talks about Latin America at all – be it conventional IR or indeed more postie or constructivist approaches[[1]](#footnote-1). Most coverage of the region is about the United States doing something to or in Latin America and such activities are framed either as a ‘legitimate security concerns’, or as reflecting a barely concealed imperialism. The contextual or historical work focuses on US interventions (such as Chile, Guatemala or Nicaragua) and Latin America is deployed in cautionary tales about issues such as economic instability, political corruption, violent societies and the drugs trade. Latin Americans also become international actors if they are migrants, but only if they attempt to set foot on US soil. These issues are mostly dealt with as being US foreign policy concerns and the impact on Latin Americans themselves is seldom considered. This emphasis on US actions and its foreign policy anxieties is on one level very understandable, given the prominence of the USA in global politics and its unerring assumption that it holds the position as regional leader. It is also perhaps explained by the dominance of US scholarship in IR more generally, and of US scholarship about Latin America in particular – this is their intellectual backyard as much as their geopolitical one[[2]](#footnote-2). Especially for conventional approaches to IR, Latin America’s importance lies in its position on the Whitehouse or CIA agenda and as such, it is mostly seen as a place of threat (or pity), as a caricature of barbaric danger, characterised by violence, terror, economic chaos, and drugs. ¶ In this way, Latin America is portrayed as a passive recipient of US actions, or if it is an agent, it is a dangerous one. The region is unnervingly dangerous because its threats are under-hand and not inter-state wars - one of the curious characteristics of the region is that remarkably few inter-state wars have taken place over the last 200 years. This renders Latin America invisible as an agent (because making wars or peace is a key-sign of agency for IR) yet visible as a shadowy, menacing presence. The region is therefore a place to be known about because it was feared[[3]](#footnote-3), not as a place to warrant investigation on its own terms, a source of policy solutions or where significant and different knowledge might be generated. It seems that bad economics, corruption and demagoguery is what IR – or at least the conventional sort – is pre-programmed to take notice of. This makes it impossible for IR to ‘see’ Latin America, which in turn undermines its claim to make sense of the world.

**The modus operandi of the affirmative’s economics is the historical drive behind colonization and mass violence against latin America culminating in wars, violence and genocide in the name of their economic ideals**

**Escobar 2004** [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎

One of the main consequences, for Santos, of the collapse of emancipation into regulation is the structural predominance of exclusion over inclusion. Either because of the exclusion of many of those formerly included, or because those who in the past were candidates for inclusion are now prevented from being so, the problematic of exclusion has become terribly accentuated, with ever growing numbers of people thrown into a veritable “state of nature.” The size of the excluded class varies of course with the centrality of the country in the world system, but it is particularly staggering in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The result is a new type of social fascism as “a social and civilizational regime” (p. 453). This regime, paradoxically, coexists with democratic societies, hence its novelty. This fascism may operate in various modes: in terms of spatial exclusion; territories struggled over by armed actors; the fascism of insecurity; and of course the deadly financial fascism, which at times dictates the marginalization of entire regions and countries that do not fulfill the conditions needed for capital, according to the IMF and its faithful management consultants (pp. 447-458). To the former Third World corresponds the highest levels of social fascism of these kinds. This is, in sum, the world that is being created by globalization from above, or hegemonic globalization.¶ Before moving on, it is important to complete this rough representation of today’s global capitalist modernity by looking at the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Among other things, this episode has made at last two things particularly clear: first, the willingness to use unprecedented levels of violence to enforce dominance on a global scale; second, the unipolarity of the current empire. In ascension since the Thatcher-Reagan years, this unipolarity reached its climax with the post-9/11 regime, based on a new convergence of military, economic, political and religious interests in the United States. In Alain Joxe’s (2002) compelling vision of imperial globality, what we have been witnessing since the first Gulf War is the rise of an empire that increasingly operates through the management of asymmetrical and spatialized violence, territorial control, sub-contracted massacres, and “cruel little wars,” all of which are aimed at imposing the neo-liberal capitalist project. At stake is a type of regulation that operates through the creation of a new horizon of global violence. This empire regulates disorder through financial and military means, pushing chaos to the extent possible to the outskirts of empire, creating a “predatory” peace to the benefit of a global noble caste and leaving untold poverty and suffering in its path. It is an empire that does not take responsibility for the wellbeing of those over whom it rules. As Joxe puts it: “The world today is united by a new form of chaos, an imperial chaos, dominated by the imperium of the United States, though not controlled by it. We lack the words to describe this new system, while being surrounded by its images. ... World leadership through chaos, a doctrine that a rational European school would have difficulty imagining, necessarily leads to weakening states –even in the United States—through the emerging *sovereignty* of corporations and markets.” (2002: 78, 213).¶ 7¶ The new empire thus operates not so much through conquest, but through the imposition of norms (free-markets, US-style democracy and cultural notions of consumption, and so forth). The former Third World is, above all, the theatre of a multiplicity of cruel little wars which, rather than barbaric throwbacks, are linked to the current global logic. From Colombia and Central America to Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East these wars take place within states or regions, without threatening empire but fostering conditions favorable to it. For much of the former Third World (and of course to the Third World within the core) is reserved “the World-chaos” (107), free-market slavery, and selective genocide. In some cases, this amounts to a sort of “paleo-micro- colonialism” within regions (157), in others to balkanization, in yet others to brutal internal wars and massive displacement to free up entire regions for transnational capital (particularly in the case of oil, but also diamonds, timber, water, genetic resources, and agricultural lands). Often times these cruel little wars are fueled by Mafia networks, and intended for macro-economic globalization. It is clear that this new Global Empire (“the New World Order of the American imperial monarchy,” p. 171) articulates the “peaceful expansion” of the free-market economy with omnipresent violence in a novel regime of economic and military globality –in other words, the global economy comes to be supported by a global organization of violence and vice versa (200). On the subjective side, what increasingly one finds in the Souths (including the South within the North) are “diced identities” and the transformation of cultures of solidarity into cultures of destruction.

**The logic of the affirmative must be refused. it predetermines the value of existence according to western knowledge and productivity, all that fall short are discardable populations readied for extermination**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

Finally, the fifth logic of nonexistence is the logic of productivity. It resides in the monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity and efficiency, which privileges growth through market forces. This criteria apply both to nature and to human labor. Productive nature is nature at its maximum fertility in a given production cycle, whereas productive labor is labor that maximizes generating profit likewise in a given production cycle. In its extreme version of conservative utopia neoliberalism aims to convert labor into a productive force among others, subject to the laws of the market as any other productive force. It has been doing this by transforming labor into a global resource while at the same time preventing at any cost the emergence of a global labor market (via immigration laws, violation of labor standards, union busting, etc.) According to the logic of capitalist productivity, nonexistence is produced in the form of nonproductiveness. Applied to nature, nonproductiveness is sterility; applied to labor, “discardable populations”, laziness, professional disqualification, lack of skills.¶ There are thus five principal social forms of nonexistence produced by hegemonic epistemology and rationality: the ignorant, the residual, the inferior, the local, and the nonproductive. They are social forms of nonexistence because the realities to which they give shape are present only as obstacles vis-à-vis the realities deemed relevant, be they scientific, advanced, superior, global, or productive realities. They are, therefore, disqualified parts of homogeneous totalities, which, as such, merely confirm what exists, and precisely as it exists. They are what exist under irretrievably disqualified forms of existing.

**Our alternative is to refuse the logic of neoliberal expansion. This is a fracturing of the logic of economic singularity of neoliberal expansion by recognizing the possibility for other forms of noncapitalist economy – this refusal is competitive as it substantiates a material rejection of US economic inevitability onto the rest of the world**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

t he ecology of productivities. Finally, in the domain of the fifth logic, the monoculture of capitalist productivity, the sociology of absences consists in recuperating and valorizing alternative systems of production, popular economic organizations, workers’ cooperatives, self-managed enterprises, solidarity economy, etc., which have been hidden or discredited by the capitalist orthodoxy of productivity. This is perhaps the most controversial domain of the sociology of absences, for it confronts directly both the paradigm of development and infinite economic growth and the logic of the primacy of the objectives of accumulation over the objectives of distribution that sustain global capitalism. Peasant movements for access to land, land tenure, agrarian reform or against mega-development projects, urban movements for housing rights, informal economy and popular economy movements, indigenous movements to defend or to regain their historical territories and the natural resources found in them, low caste movements in India to protect their land and local forests, all these movements base their claims and their struggles on the ecology of productivities.¶ In each of the five domains, the objective of the sociology of absences is to disclose and to give credit to the diversity and multiplicity of social practices and confer credit to them in opposition to the exclusive credibility of hegemonic practices. The idea of multiplicity and nondestructive relations is suggested by the concept of ecology: ecology of knowledges, ecology of temporalities, ecology of recognitions, ecology of transcales, and ecology of productivities. Common to all these ecologies is the idea that reality cannot be reduced to what exists. It amounts to an ample version of realism that includes the realities rendered absent by silence, suppression, and marginalization. In a word, realities that are actively produced as nonexistent.¶ In conclusion, the exercise of the sociology of absences is counterfactual and takes place by confronting conventional scientific commonsense. To be carried out it demands, both epistemological imagination and democratic imagination. Epistemological imagination allows for the recognition of different knowledges, perspectives and scales of identification, analysis and evaluation of practices. Democratic imagination allows for the recognition of different practices and social agents. Both the epistemological and the democratic imagination have a deconstructive and a reconstructive dimension. Deconstruction assumes five forms, corresponding to the critique of the five logics of hegemonic rationality, namely un-thinking, de-residualizing, de- racializing, de-localizing, and de-producing. Reconstruction is comprised of the five ecologies mentioned above.

## Links

### Link – US engagement – latin america

**Latin America is regarded by the plan according to a historical binary that devalues latin America and naturializes western economics and power relationships over the recipient country**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

Let me return to the issue that I started with – the sense that Latin America is irrelevant to IR in its own right and appears as the object of US fears and/or as the subject of US interventions. On the one hand, the Americas are understood as a binary, divided by the Rio Grande. This split emerged during the mid-nineteenth century and was vocalised by the French intellectual Michel Chevalier. He drew on European understandings of themselves as being divided between the Latin, Catholic, southern, (poorer), countries and the Teutonic, Protestant, northern, (richer) countries[[4]](#footnote-4). This basic distinction was transposed onto the Americas, setting up a binary through which Canada is lumped in with the USA and the Caribbean is excised. This sense of a binary in the Americas has been astonishingly enduring; the role of Latin America is to act as an ‘other’ and it plays a pivotal role in the making of US identity through imperialism. Yet on the other hand, Latin America’s position in the global order is not as a ‘Third World other’ but rather as an extreme manifestation of the Occident, of Europe. This view was established at the outset, as Walter Mignolo explains: “During the sixteenth century, when ‘America’ became conceptualized as such by... intellectuals of the North..., it was implicit that America was neither the land of Shem (the Orient) nor the land of Ham (Africa) but the enlargement of the land of Japheth”[[5]](#footnote-5). This idea derived from the assumed superiority of the conquering classes who saw native Americans as being incapable of developing the full potential of the Americas, which legitimised their appropriation of the territory. Indeed, these supposedly primitive peoples were (and still are!) often considered to be more a part of the exploitable natural world than the human one[[6]](#footnote-6). The notion that it was the Europeans who ‘made’ the Americas (both north and south) is still an operational assumption and is one of the foundations of Manifest Destiny. ¶ This intriguing doubleness – European sameness/difference – lies at the ambiguous heart of the Americas, but it is much more plain to see in the South. This is partly because indigenous peoples are far more prominent – numerically and politically – in the South, but also because the extreme success of the USA makes it very hard to argue against as a model for the ‘good life’. Yet if we take the long view from 1492, and if we start our thinking about the Americas from the south, the USA begins to look very different. This in turn has some big implications for IR. ¶ The face which the US presents to the world is one of a reconciled and settled settler society and its economic and social ‘success’ justifies the right to pronounce on the political and economic fitness of countries, to set global policy agendas or to intervene, where deemed necessary. It is precisely because Latin America is the United States’ alter-ego – its self and other, its disreputable cousin – that it is a perfect foil for the US when looking from the top-down, making obvious the development, sophistication and success of the country. If we turn this relationship on its head, though, and look from the bottom-up, the southern Americas become ideally placed to parochialize the global hegemon, and to reveal the injustice, contingency and sheer *coloniality* of the USA[[7]](#footnote-7). Foregrounding the intimate connection between coloniality and modernity invites us to open the ‘hidden’ colonial side of the US, a place which not only had colonial relationships back then but also reflects colonial experiences right now*.*

### Link – latin America frame

**The ontological approach to latin America in the aff is one of a civilizing project to assimilate the elemetns of savagery in the latin America regions**

**Baker 2009** [Michael, [University of Rochester](http://rochester.academia.edu/), [Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development](http://rochester.academia.edu/Departments/Warner_Graduate_School_of_Education_and_Human_Development), Graduate Student, Situating Modern Western Education within the Modern/colonial World System, Unpublished Paper ,June 2009 , academia.edu

¶

The modern/colonial world system perspective is part of a contemporary Latin American post-Eurocentric critique of modernity (Mignolo, 2000a, 2005, 2007; Dussel, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000; Quijano, 2000, 2007, 2008; Escobar, 2007; Morana, Dussel, & Jauregui, 2008). As described above, from this perspective, Eurocentric modernity is interpreted as a civilizing project of incorporation and marginalization, based upon a civilization-savagism paradigm. This critique shares with work in postcolonial criticism, historical sociology, and historical geography the claim that Western Europe constituted itself as "civilization" through a political economy of alterization of its Others (Spivak, 1999; Delanty, 1995; Agnew, 2003). Alterity is not just the opposite of the “same”, but the incorporation of the “same” into the fashioning of the “other” (Mignolo, 2001, p. 184). This division between civilized and uncivilized, referred to here as the civilization-savagism paradigm, is a consequence of early modern European identity formation. European identity formation during the sixteenth century is the beginning of the modern project to organize the planet according to the ideals of European civilization that continue to dominate the present world order (Delanty, 1995). The European mission to civilize the planet is essentially characterized by the need to protect civilization from savagism and to design institutions that incorporate the savage into civilization. Differences between the European image of the civilized self and the un-civilized Other are interpreted as deficiencies and therefore requiring the subjectification of the Other to the civilizing processes of Europeanization. Described further in part four below, Christianize, civilize, modernize and marketize label four successive redemptive-civilizational missions of Eurocentric modernity (Mignolo, 2000). If the Other cannot be assimilated, they become dispensible within the universalized binary civilizational project, i.e., barbarian, savage or primitive, undeveloped, non-competitive. ¶ “Latin America” for example, was constituted as the Other of both Europe and the United States. European categories shape the “idea” of Latin America both from inside (the Europeanized component of its population) and from outside (the “othering” to which Latin America has been subjected by the Western European and US gaze) (Mignolo, 2005). ¶ The self-fashioning of Europe as the home of modernity has been premised on the colonization of the vast regions of the world that are seen as backward and in need of civilization. The ambivalent Latin American discourse of modernity, in its rejection of European domination but its internalization of its civilizing mission, has taken the form of a process of self-colonization which assumes distinct forms in different political contexts and historical periods. (Coronil, 1997, p. 73) ¶ ¶ Latin America participated in the European civilizational project continued by Europeans of Latin descent, in which Indians and Afros (with the exceptions of those from Haiti and Martinique) did not participate (Ribeiro, 1971; Rojas, 2002; Mignolo, 2005). Postindependence Columbia (1849-1878) for example, according the Cristina Rojas, was characterized by a desire for civilization on the part of enlightened creole elite (2002, p. xxvi). ¶ In the nineteenth century Columbia, the “will to civilization” was related to the prospect of the disappearance of old systems of hierarchy and power and the emergence of new forms that would imitate the ideal of European civilization. The ideal of civilization materialized in the privileging of certain economic practices, in religious and educational ideals, in habits and dress practices, and in the dream of a *civilizacion mestiza* in which whiteness would remove the traces of black and indigenous past. (Rojas, 2002, p. xxvi) ¶ ¶ From Mexico to Argentina, the violence of the European culture of conquest and colonization continued after decolonization in Latin America’s own self-fashioning. The nation-state’s appearance as the agent of civilization in the nineteenth-century involves the reformation of Eurocentric modernity in which the racialized violence linked to capitalism is rationalized as the natural expansion of universal reason and scientific truth (Coronil, 1997, p. 74).

### Link – economic engagement

**Economic engagement universalizes a colonizing epistemology that reinforces the hierarchy that perpetuates ways of knowing that privilege the white heterosexual male**

**Baker 2009** [Michael, [University of Rochester](http://rochester.academia.edu/), [Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development](http://rochester.academia.edu/Departments/Warner_Graduate_School_of_Education_and_Human_Development), Graduate Student, Situating Modern Western Education within the Modern/colonial World System, Unpublished Paper ,June 2009 , academia.edu

This interpretation of modernity as intertwined with coloniality of power offers an original critique of the Eurocentric production of knowledge and subjectivity, global racial formation, and their interrelated links in the history of the world capitalist system. Modern epistemology and modern economic ideology are intertwined in the relation between a subject and an object, and the economical relation between a subject and its private property (Quijano, 1999). Western epistemology “runs parallel to the history of capitalism” (Mignolo, 2002, p. 78) and is complicit with racism, sexism, and universalism. The subject-object western epistemological model that organizes mentalities and lives in the modern world grew out of the historical process of colonial and economic dominance and has, in turn, provided an ideological justification for this dominance (Quijano, 2000; Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 2000a). The philosophical foundation of Eurocentric modernity was built on the knowing subject that was constructed from the prototype of White, heterosexual, European male. This particular ethno-cultural way of knowing the world was universalized as the only or best way of being. Consequently, knowledges and experiences of all those who are *not* White, heterosexual, European men were and are excluded, unless they are willing and able to acculturate (Mignolo, 2005, p. 138). This Eurocentric conception of knowledge provides the powerful justification for assuming the inferiority of all other knowing subjects who are not White, heterosexual, male, and European (or of European descent) (Mignolo, 2005, p. 139). ¶ Coloniality essentially names the hegemony of European knowledge and being through the hierarchical incorporation of all other cultures into a Eurocentric cultural project.¶ The incorporation of such diverse and heterogenous cultural histories into a single world dominated by Europe signified a cultural and intellectual intersubjective configuration equivalent to the articulation of all forms of labor control around capital, a configuration that established world capitalism. In effect, all the experiences, histories, resources, and cultural products ended up in one global order revolving around European or Western hegemony. Europe’s hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony. (Quijano, 2008, pp. 188-189) ¶ Coloniality of power is thus a principle and strategy of control and domination that is constitutive of western modernity as a long series of political, economic, cultural and educational projects. “The concept of coloniality has opened up the re-construction and the restitution of silenced histories, repressed subjectivities, subalternized knowledges and languages performed by the Totality depicted under the names of modernity and rationality” (Mignolo, 2007, p. 451). The critique of coloniality must therefore entail the critique of its epistemic nucleus (Eurocentrism), that is, a critique of the type of knowledge that contributed to the legitimation of European colonial domination and its pretenses of universal validation. Understanding Eurocentrism within the history of its emergence in the sixteenth century calls forth the creative inclusion and integration of subaltern knowledges and corresponding ways of being in the post-Eurocentric curriculum. ¶ In summary, the *modern world-system* can thus be characterized in part as a structure of exploitation and domination, conceptualized and legitimized within the epistemic framework of Eurocentrism and the rhetoric of modernity. ¶ The history of the modern world-system has been in large part a history of the expansion of European states and peoples into the rest of the world. This has been an essential part of the construction of a capitalist world-economy. The expansion has involved, in most regions of the world, military conquest, economic exploitation, and massive injustices. Those who have led and profited most from this expansion have presented it to themselves and the world as justified on the grounds of the greater good that such expansion has had for the world’s population. The ususal argument is that the expansion has spread something variously called civilization, economic growth, and development, and/or progress. All of these words have been interpreted as expressions of universal values, encrusted in what is often called natural law. Therefore, it has been asserted that this expansion was not merely beneficial to humankind but also historically inevitable. The languge used to describe this activity has been sometimes theological and sometimes derived from a secular philosophical worldview. (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 1)

**The plan is a continuation of ideological pushes to impose colonial violence upon countries designated as third world**

**Escobar 2004** [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎

1. At the level of imperial globality, novel types of coalitions, either regionally based (e.g., the Andean countries; West Africa) or networked according to other criteria (e.g., size, existence of a large technocratic elite and economic and technological basis; for instance, a coalition of some of the larger countries in the former Third World, even at the level of reformist elites vis à vis the excesses of imperial globality). By novel I mean complicating the nation-state and regional economies, for instance. Is it unthinkable to imagine, for instance, a pan-Andean confederation of autonomous regions drawn on cultural-ecological considerations, rather than traditional geo-political concerns? This would be a confederation without nation-states, of course. Given the current role of many states within imperial globality it is not unthinkable that the former Third World could be better off in a world without states, with the proviso that both local/regional and¶ 19¶ meta-national forms of structuring and governance be created that avoid the most dreadful traps of the nation-state while creating new forms of protection and negotiation.¶ 2. It is clear by now that the Argentinean crisis was caused not by insufficient integration into the global economy but rather because of an excess of it. Even dutifully following the neo-liberal advise of the IMF or homegrown economists did not save this important country from a profound crisis. Why can’t we dare to imagine the unaimaginable, that Argentina could have a better chance by stepping somewhat outside and beyond imperial globality, rather than staying fully within it? Can partial delinking –selective delinking and selective reengagement—offer an alternative path, perhaps at the level of world regions (e.g, Southern Cone), or network of world regions? This means that it would be possible to rethink the proposal of delinking introduced by Samir Amin in the 1970s to fit the new conditions.10 Needless to say, everything seems to militate against this possibility. The proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA, as it is known in Latin America and FTAA as it is known in North America) is being pushed forward with considerable force by the United States and most Latin American leaders. And of course any country or region that dares to attempt a path of autonomy is bound to incur the ire of empire, risking military action. This is why opposition against ALCA is today indelibly linked to opposition against militarism by most activist organizations.¶ These are just two examples of the kind of “macro” thinking that while not radical, could create better conditions for the struggle against imperial globality and global coloniality. If approached from this vantage point, they are likely to contribute to advance the idea that other worlds are possible. The social movements of the past decade are, in effect, a sign that this struggle is already under way. Imagining “after the Third World” could become a more integral part of the imaginary of these movements; this would involve, as we saw, imagining beyond modernity and the regimes of economy, war, coloniality, exploitation of people and nature, and social fascism it has brought about in its imperial global incarnation.

### Link - terrorism

Coloniality entails the era past colonialism that uses threats of terror to justify expansion and economic control

**Escobar 2004** [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎

Some partial conclusions: Coloniality incorporates colonialism and imperialism but goes beyond them; this is why coloniality did not end with the end of colonialism (formal independence of nation states), but was re-articulated in terms of the post-World War II imaginary of three worlds (which in turn replaced the previous articulations in terms of Occidentalism and Orientalism). Similarly, the “end of the Third World” entails a rearticulation of the coloniality of power and knowledge. As we have seen, this rearticulation takes the form of both imperial globality (new global link between economic and military power) and global coloniality (the emergent classificatory orders and forms of alterization that are replacing the Cold War order). The new coloniality regime is still difficult to discern. Race, class and ethnicity will continue to be important, but new, or newly prominent, areas of articulation come into existence, such as religion (and gender linked to it, especially in the case of Islamic societies, as we saw for the war on Afghanistan). However, the single most prominent vehicle of coloniality today seems to be the ambiguously drawn figure of the “terrorist.” Linked most forcefully to the Middle East, and thus to the immediate US oil and strategic interests in the region (vis à vis the European Union and Russia, on the one hand, and China and India in particular on the other, as the most formidable potential challengers), the imaginary of the terrorist can have a wide field of application (it has already been applied to Basque militants and Colombian guerrillas, for instance). Indeed, after 9/11, we are all potential terrorists, unless you are American, White, conservative Christian, and Republican –in actually or epistemically (that is, in mindset).¶ This means that in seeking to overcome the myth of modernity, it is necessary to abandon the notion of the Third World as a particular articulation of that myth. Similarly, the problematic of social emancipation needs to be refracted through the lens of coloniality. Emancipation, as it was mentioned, needs to be de-Westernized (also the economy). If social fascism has become a permanent condition of imperial globality, emancipation has to deal with global coloniality. This means conceiving it from the perspective of the colonial difference. What does emancipation –or liberation, the preferred language of some of the MC authors-- mean when seen through the lens of coloniality, that is, beyond exclusion defined in social, economic and political terms? Finally, if not the third world, what? “Worlds and knowledges otherwise,” based on the politics of difference from the perspective of the coloniality of power, as we shall see in the final section. 7

### Link – ports

**The focus on ports replicates legal codificiations of identities through inspection – strengthening ports becomes an apparatus for managing populations**

**Heyman 2004** [Josiah, department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas, El Paso, Ports of Entry as Nodes in the World System, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 11:3, 303-327]

When people move through ports, legal identifications are affirmed, applied, or rejected through a bureaucratic–police process called “inspection.” Inspection re- sembles Foucaldian “surveillance,” though it is not necessarily all-encompassing and effective in internal disciplining (Heyman 1999a). Rather, ports should be understood in the context of the interplay of government officers and active popu- laces. As Alan Smart has written for the pairing of state law enforcement and ille- gal practices, “we need to work from both ends simultaneously and hope that we manage to connect up in the middle” (1999: 100). Thus, in analyzing inspections, I distinguish “identifications” imposed from outside from self-assumed “identi- ties” (Heyman 2001: 130). Inspections concentrate tremendous complexity into a short moment of interaction. Understanding how inspectors and entrants orches- trate these complicated actions demands close ethnographic attention, but repays it with great insights into the making and regulation of mobility.

People enter land ports in two ways, on foot and as the driver and passengers in cars. There are differences in how ports handle these two kinds of entrants, but I will concentrate on crucial elements of inspection found in both cases. The first meeting of entrant with state officer is called, not surprisingly, “primary inspec- tion.” The decision at primary is whether people and vehicles can directly proceed into the national interior or are sent to a waiting area to the side of the exit for more extended “secondary inspections.” At the latter, definite identifications are made, from admission to rejection or even arrest and prosecution. Primary inspections at this border include both examination of goods (customs functions) and people (immigration functions) and inspectors from the two federal agencies (the Cus- toms Service and the INS1) are cross-designated to share responsibility (these roles bifurcate in the secondary area). Primary inspectors make decisions under amaz- ingly tight time constraints. The management yardstick for busy ports such as El Paso or San Ysidro, which are under “elevated threat advisory” (the current nor- mal condition), is one vehicle cleared every thirty seconds on average. Although periodic “high” alert conditions dilate this time standard (e.g., by requiring physi- cal examination of at least one compartment per vehicle), there are countervailing pressures to speed up traffic clearance under normal circumstances, including the negative health and safety effects of backed-up traffic and the cross-border tour- ism, retail, and manufacturing coalitions that pressure port management to facili- tate border crossing (see Heyman 1999b on local political contexts of ports). Al- though ambiguous cases can be sent to secondary, in busy ports secondary areas become overcrowded with referrals, so there is constant verbal feedback on the availability of secondary space to primary inspectors. Hence, there is no substitute for snap judgments at primary.

The problem for inspectors is that they have to make judgments at one restricted place and time about personal and legal situations ramifying backward and for- ward in time and space. For example, a person speaking English with a heavy Spanish accent declared that he was a United States citizen, returning from visit- ing his mother in Agua Prieta, Sonora, and that his residence was south Phoenix. On moving from primary to secondary, where he was questioned in detail, he indi- cated that he was born in the United States, moved with his parents to Mexico in his early childhood, and returned to the United States to live with an older sister as a fifteen-year-old, where he attended high school for two years before dropping out to work on a gardening crew. The question at stake was whether he actually was a United States citizen by birth with every right to return to his home and job in Phoenix or was making a false claim to United States citizenship. There is no definitive identification for United States citizenship, no national United States identity card, so the admission process involves a contested set of inferences about this person’s past (why he spoke English, but very poorly; why he was familiar with a high school in Phoenix) and his activities and societal involvements in two nations beyond that observable in the port itself (why he was in Sonora during the Christmas period, what rights he had or did not have to be working on a gardening crew in Arizona). He was admitted from secondary, in the space of two minutes, on the basis of his familiarity with the Phoenix high school, a reasonable and prob- ably fair but by no means certain decision. We will find crucial the means by which such decisions are made, the contexts that govern these means, the aggre- gate pattern of such decisions, and the accumulated national and world-systemic impacts of that aggregated mass of snap decisions.

This inspection becomes inherently racialized upon populations

**Heyman 2004** [Josiah, department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas, El Paso, Ports of Entry as Nodes in the World System, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 11:3, 303-327]

Furthermore, this inspection of the body includes pseudobiological racial pro- filing, in which the citizenship of apparently “white” or “black” Americans is not questioned absent other issues, while the citizenship and/or immigration status of apparently Latino entrants will be questioned; inspection for customs purposes is not as contingent on assumed ancestry, however. This is also inflected by the per- ceived first language or accent in English of the speaker. For example, I am a United States citizen of Eastern European Jewish and British ancestry and, over many years of entering United States ports on the Mexican border, have never had my declaration of citizenship questioned, but Mexican origin companions often have. However, I experienced considerable skepticism of my claim that I lived in Mexico (at one time) and was not carrying anything to the United States. As a consequence, my car has been on occasion meticulously combed over for contra- band.Citizens enter the United States automatically, but as soon as a question is raised about citizenship, inspectors move to sort out citizens (who do not need to carry any identification as such) from various legitimate noncitizen entrants, who bear a complicated set of statuses and documents. The inspector must not only know the authentication marks of possible documents, but also must weigh the specific rights implied by a document against the stated intentions of the entrants and their rela- tions (familial, etc.) to each other. Inspectors are quietly looking for the possible frauds associated with each status and document. These include counterfeit docu- ments, altered real documents (e.g., photograph replacement), fraudulent use of real documents (e.g., using someone else’s card), and real documents belonging to the proper bearer but being misused in the United States interior (e.g., working illegally on a local shopping and visiting visa).

### Link – Cuba economy

Cuban economic reforms result in bloated capitalist bureaucracies instead of genuine economic reformation

**Cameron 2010** [Marce Behind the layoffs in Cuba Issue 28: November-December 2010, direct action, socialism for 21st century, <http://directaction.org.au/issue28/behind_the_layoffs_in_cuba>

Furthermore, the economic reforms tend to undermine, rather than strengthen, the bureaucratic tendencies in Cuba’s socialist state. The long-term aim of Cuba’s economic “updating” is to have 80% of the workforce engaged directly in production and services, with far fewer professional administrators. The workforce rationalisation is not aimed at socially productive workers, but at reducing unnecessary administrative personnel; it is aimed at cutting the size of what is often referred to, misleadingly, as “the bureaucracy”. If increased productivity is inherently desirable in any society, so, too, is the reduction of bloated government payrolls. We’re used to capitalist politicians telling us that the “public sector” is “bloated” and must be “rationalised”, which usually means that social services that benefit working people are to be cut back, or privatised, so that more tax dollars can be spent on subsidising capitalist profitability. In Cuba the aim of the production of goods and services is not the maximisation of capitalist profits, but the social needs of the working people. As a result, rising productivity means being able to reduce what it costs the working people as a whole to produce the goods and services.In Cuba, however, there has been a rather loose relationship between the numbers of workers needed to do the job well and the numbers of employees “on the books” in most state-owned enterprises. Some employees, particularly some administrative workers, quite literally hardly work at all, either because they’re absent from the workplace for long periods during work hours, or because there is little for them to do when they do show up for work. In Cuba, payrolls really are bloated.

### Link – mexico

The expansion of neoliberalism to mexico is touted according to rationales of pragmatism and inevitability which cover the history of violence from NAFTA, the plan is a liberal ploy to continue the economy

ROB **URIE 2012** [ Rob, *artist and political economist in New York.*

Free Trade and Economic Imperialism Economic Progress Toward Ecological Suicide WEEKEND EDITION NOVEMBER 30-32, 2012

Likewise, political ‘liberals’ have been the primary facilitators of the ascendancy of the radical right in both academia and politics. In academia liberals have functioned much like progressives in an earlier age, producing ‘reasoned’ rationales in their economics for economic imperialism. And in politics liberals play three essential roles: to insist political differences are matters of degree to be ‘worked through’ rather than the irreconcilable differences of competing interests; to derail meaningful political action until a ‘better time’ in the future that never arrives, and to claim the political center no matter how far the rightward march has taken it.¶ In the dimensions of economics and the environment ‘reason,’ both academic and political, is producing unreasonable outcomes for most people. The ‘managed’ neo-liberalism of academic economics pays lip service to the looming catastrophe of global warming that its own radical capitalism produces. If economic ‘growth,’ as measured by traditional metrics like GDP (Gross Domestic Product), is desirable and it represents the output of industrial capitalism contributing to global warming, as it does, then ‘solutions’ to global warming are simply attempts to clean up the catastrophes and dislocations that capitalists and their academic apologists create. But as is becoming increasingly obvious, these catastrophes never get cleaned up.¶ For example, about a decade after NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) was passed in the early 1990s [cheap American corn flooded Mexico and destroyed the peasant agriculture](http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Mexico-s-corn-farmers-see-their-livelihoods-2515188.php) that had sustained millions of peasant farmers for generations. Their livelihoods destroyed, those ‘freed’ from the land went to work either in Maquiladoras, factories established by multi-national corporations in Mexico to exploit cheap labor, or migrated to the U.S. in search of work.¶ Most of the corn exported to Mexico is ‘genetically modified’ and cross breeds (pollinates) with domestic strains to render the traditional food supply suspect. Subsequent U.S. policy diverted U.S. corn from the food supply to ethanol production causing its price to rise just as Wall Street began ‘financializing’ agriculture through dedicated investment in agricultural ‘commodities’ funds. The result was that people whose indigenous economies had been destroyed by cheap agricultural imports instantly faced starvation as the imported food that consumed most of their incomes became unaffordable.¶ In the U.S. the ‘financial crisis’ and global recession caused by de-regulated finance was then exploited by cynical and / or ignorant politicians to scapegoat for domestic economic travails the displaced peasant farmers from Mexico who had come to the U.S. looking for work. The circumstances of these economic refugees thus diminished, many now feed the detention and deportation ‘industries’ as new and ever more intrusive ‘free-trade’ agreements are negotiated in secret and to the exclusion of those affected by them.

### Link – Cuba

Cuban elites manipulate the plan to enjoin cuba to neoliberalism the alternative msut ethically refuse neoliberalism as inevitable in cuba

**Perez 2012**, Yenisel Rodriguez The Ideological Success of Neoliberalism in Cuba, april 29, 2012

<http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=68708#sthash.AH2iVn39.dpuf>

HAVANA TIMES, April 29 — The economic and social failure of neoliberalism is an established fact. In the economic sphere it has led the world into a deep crisis, while socially it has generated greater inequality than any previous economic model.¶ These effects are reported daily by the official Cuban media.¶ Despite this, we know that the Cuban government has affected a neoliberal shift in its reform policies.¶ Nonetheless, even today it’s difficult to find a direct connection between the socioeconomic “reforms” implemented by the government and fundamentals of international neoliberalism.¶ The similarities, which clearly exist, fail to form a definite pattern of neoliberal-style economic and social policy.¶ This is why it’s so difficult to follow the economic moves of the political elite in their desperate retreat toward the deregulation of the economy.¶ However at the ideological level, this complicity is apparent. It’s at this level that neoliberalism has become hegemonic in Cuba.¶ The ideological foundations of neoliberalism have achieved a tremendous success in the sphere of the government on the island.¶ The authorities have proclaimed the deregulation of Cuba’s economy as inevitable, as they quietly accept the consolidation of inequality as well as decreased social spending and the renunciation of full employment as a goal.¶ These are basic principles of neoliberalism, ones reflected by measures which they say should guide economic policy over the times to come.¶ The government is convinced that neoliberalism has won the ideological battle on the field of international relations, despite its economic and social failures.¶ Because of this they are paving the way for a future of the radicalized application of its principles of economic deregulation and social inequality.¶ Given this, the proposed real alternatives to the neoliberal model will remain the responsibility of the Cuban people and non-official social movements that are consolidating themselves across the country.¶ Those on top will continue to sell out the country to the highest bidder, which will always be some empire at the world scale.

Capital expansion into cuba replicates a segregation of the Cuban population against the western voyeur

Julie **Mazzei 2012** , Department of Political Science, Kent State University, USA, Negotiating domestic socialism with global capitalism: So-called tourist apartheid in Cuba, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 45, Issues 1–2, March–June 2012, Pages 91–103, In Search of Legitimacy: Post-Soviet De Facto States Between Institutional Stabilization and Political Transformation

The expansion into the civilian economy, particularly capitalist components of it, and its oversight of joint ventures procured an enviable role for the FAR in the Cuban economy. Many assess that high ranking and retired members of the FAR have become a class of individuals with access to “jobs and privileges” not available to average Cubans, and that these individuals have “become the privileged interlocutors with foreign capital and perhaps an embryonic proto-capitalist class” ([Mujal-León and Buzón, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib43): 411–412).[Klepak (2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib31): 85) indicates that members of the FAR had access to goods via the TRDs or “*Tiendas de Recuperacion de Divisas*," or foreign currency recovery stores, also managed under the military system, that average Cubans did not, though he also indicates that the advantages while real are probably not extreme (91). [Aranda (2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib2): 206; [Mastrapa and Armando, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib36): 431; [Mora, 2004](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib42)) argues that the system has created a group of elite comparable to the “national and international bourgeoisie class that helps account for foreign capital and investment in the [Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism] regime…” One could conclude that the military as an institution and its leaders as individuals have generally benefited from the dual economy period.¶ Thus in Cuba there is a dominant group in the military/party, but Cubans were not segregated from that dominant group (neither the military nor the party). This is not to say that the power elite in Cuba did not or do not continue to have privileges that “average” Cubans do not have; but this in and of itself does not constitute apartheid (and, in fact, can be seen in a range of different political systems, as “the 99%” occupying Wall St. might argue). In too many authoritarian regimes particularly, the state utilizes policies unquestionably debilitating for some members of their population, policies that repress dissent, restrict rights and outright oppress. Does this indicate a system of apartheid? Certainly it does not. Apartheid is a particular type of authoritarianism.¶ Furthermore, as noted extensively above, apartheid is a particular form of segregation; not all segregation constitutes a system of apartheid. Segregation in Cuba did not separate the power elite from the “other,” defined by some identity-based collectivity, as in apartheid. Rather, Cubans were denied access to facilities reserved for a separate, unorganized, extra-state and powerless group: tourists. Segregation did not empower tourists, nor put them in a position of dominance over the prohibited group, as in an apartheid system. Indeed, tourists represented an additional actor not present in the apartheid system, an actor external to the domestic socio–economic and political equation. This is indicative that something quite different was actually at play.

### Link – engagement – a2: they want the plan

The affirmative’s understanding of public will for the plan cherry picks dominant elite requests as a justification for imperialism – history is specific to the refusal of the public toward the plan

Francis **Shor 2012**, professor wayne state Twentieth Century US Social-Cultural History, U.S. Economic Imperialism and Resistance from the Global South: A Prelude to OWS, Summer 2012 Vol:XIV-1, Whole #: 53

The devastation and disruption wrought by U.S. economic imperialism was obviously co-determined by willing ruling classes in certain countries. In numerous instances, foreign governments and their colluding political and economic elites helped to construct financial and political arrangements conducive to the array of domestic and foreign economic interests and detrimental to the poor majority. For example, in between the near bankruptcy in 1982 and the financial collapse in the mid-1990s, the Mexican Government and various bankers aided a "Washington Consensus" that tied the Reagan and Clinton Treasury Departments together with the IMF and private banks. Under Clinton’s Secretary of Treasury, Robert Rubin, a former Citibank and Wall Street manager, private banks, including Citibank, used both the Mexican and U.S. governments to salvage their bad economic investments. With the full participation of the Mexican presidents during this time, but especially by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, neoliberal policies and programs were adopted that, among other changes, privatized former communal farms and, in the process, forced Mexican peasants into the cities or across the U.S. border. Furthermore, in taking away land that had been used for subsistence farming and the growing of corn, U.S. corn imports, primarily the less nutritious and even GMO yellow corn, flooded the Mexican markets. NAFTA accelerated U.S.-subsidized agricultural imports, in particular, even though it did lead to the emergence and resistance by the Zapatistas and others in Mexican civil society.¶ ¶ WHILE PRIMARILY A RESPONSE to the debt crisis and neoliberal policies in Mexico, including the implementation of NAFTA, which, in turn, drove those on the margins into further economic and political deprivation, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional—EZLN) opened a significant front against U.S. economic imperialism and global neoliberalism. Embracing the legacy of political struggles from the Mexican past, the Zapatistas also looked forward to creating a new and better world. In the January 1 missive that accompanied their occupation in Chiapas, the legacy of past conflicts acknowledged the role of the poor, despised, and marginalized: "We are the product of 500 years of struggles: first against slavery, in the War of Independence against Spain led by the insurgents, then to keep from being absorbed by U.S. expansionism, then to enact our Constitution and expel the French Empire from our land, then the Porfiro Diaz dictatorship prevented the just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled, developing their own leadership, Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men like ourselves." After close to a year of public engagement that saw the intervention of the Mexican army and the establishment of a wary truce, the EZLN issued another declaration about their political intentions: "The Zapatista plan today remains the same as always: to change the world to make it better, more just, more free, more democratic, that is, more human."

## Impacts

### Impact – discardable populations (longer version)

**The logic of the affirmative is the logic that predetermines the value of existence according to western knowledge and productivity, all that fall short are discardable populations readied for extermination**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

There is no single, univocal way of not existing. The logics and processes through which hegemonic criteria of rationality and efficiency produce the nonexistence of what does not fit them are various. Nonexistence is produced whenever a certain entity is disqualified and rendered invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly discardable. What unites the different logics of production of nonexistence is that they are all manifestations of the same rational monoculture. I distinguish five logics or modes of production of nonexistence.¶ The first derives from the monoculture of knowledge and rigor of knowledge. It is the most powerful mode of production of nonexistence. It consists in turning modern science and high culture into the sole criteria of truth and aesthetic quality, respectively. The complicity that unites the “two cultures” (the scientific and the humanistic culture) resides in the fact that both claim to be, each in its own field, exclusive canons of production of knowledge or artistic creation. All that is not recognized or legitimated by this canon is declared nonexistent. Nonexistence appears in this case in the form of ignorance or lack of culture.¶ The second logic resides in the monoculture of linear time, the idea that history has a unique and well-known meaning and direction. This meaning and direction have been formulated in different ways in the last two hundred years: progress, modernization, development, and globalization. Common to all these formulations is the idea that time is linear and that ahead of time proceed the core countries of the world system and, along with them, the dominant knowledges, institutions and forms of sociability. This logic produces nonexistence by describing as backward (premodern, underdeveloped, etc.) whatever is asymmetrical vis-à-vis whatever is declared forward. It is according to this logic that western modernity produces the noncontemporaneity of the contemporaneous, and that the idea of simultaneity conceals the asymmetries of the historical times that converge into it. The encounter between the African peasant and the officer of the World Bank in his field trip illustrates this condition. In this case, nonexistence assumes the form of residuum, which in turn has assumed many designations for the past two hundred years, the first being the primitive or savage, closely followed by the traditional, the premodern, the simple, the obsolete, the underdeveloped.¶ The third logic is the logic of social classification, based on the monoculture of naturalization of differences. It consists in distributing populations according to categories that naturalize hierarchies. Racial and sexual classifications are the most salient manifestations of this logic. Contrary to what happens in the relation between capital and labor, social classification is based on attributes that negate the intentionality of social hierarchy. The relation of domination is the consequence, rather than the cause, of this hierarchy, and it may even be considered as an obligation of whoever is classified as superior (for example, the white man’s burden in his civilizing mission). Although the two forms of classification (race and sex) are decisive for the relation between capital and labor to stabilize and spread globally, racial classification has been the one most deeply reconstructed by capitalism.3 According to this logic, nonexistence is produced as a form of inferiority, insuperable inferiority because natural. The inferior ones, because insuperably inferior, cannot be a credible alternative to the superior ones.¶ The forth logic of production of nonexistence is the logic of the dominant scale: the monoculture of the universal and of the global. According to this logic, the scale adopted as primordial determines the irrelevance of all other possible scales. In western modernity, the dominant scale appears under two different forms: the universal and the global. Universalism is the scale of the entities or realities that prevail regardless of specific contexts. For that reason, they take precedence over all other realities that depend on contexts and are therefore considered particular or vernacular. Globalization is the scale that in the last twenty years acquired unprecedented relevance in various social fields. It is the scale that privileges entities or realities that widen their scope to the whole globe, thus earning the prerogative to designate rival entities as local. According to this logic, nonexistence is produced under the form of the particular and the local. The entities or realities defined as particular or local are captured in scales that render them incapable of being credible alternatives to what exists globally and universally.¶ Finally, the fifth logic of nonexistence is the logic of productivity. It resides in the monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity and efficiency, which privileges growth through market forces. This criteria apply both to nature and to human labor. Productive nature is nature at its maximum fertility in a given production cycle, whereas productive labor is labor that maximizes generating profit likewise in a given production cycle. In its extreme version of conservative utopia neoliberalism aims to convert labor into a productive force among others, subject to the laws of the market as any other productive force. It has been doing this by transforming labor into a global resource while at the same time preventing at any cost the emergence of a global labor market (via immigration laws, violation of labor standards, union busting, etc.) According to the logic of capitalist productivity, nonexistence is produced in the form of nonproductiveness. Applied to nature, nonproductiveness is sterility; applied to labor, “discardable populations”, laziness, professional disqualification, lack of skills.¶ There are thus five principal social forms of nonexistence produced by hegemonic epistemology and rationality: the ignorant, the residual, the inferior, the local, and the nonproductive. They are social forms of nonexistence because the realities to which they give shape are present only as obstacles vis-à-vis the realities deemed relevant, be they scientific, advanced, superior, global, or productive realities. They are, therefore, disqualified parts of homogeneous totalities, which, as such, merely confirm what exists, and precisely as it exists. They are what exist under irretrievably disqualified forms of existing.

### Impact – warming/catastrophe

The destruction of indigenous peoples is uniquely a contribution to massive catastrophes that come from neoliberal expansion

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Free Trade and Economic Imperialism Economic Progress Toward Ecological Suicide WEEKEND EDITION NOVEMBER 30-32, 2012

The destruction of a sustainable indigenous economy and its (forced) replacement with unsustainable industrial agriculture and newly ‘freed’ labor adds to the environmental catastrophe of global warming and the human catastrophes of economic disenfranchisement and dislocation. The ‘efficient’ model of industrial agriculture in use in the U.S. is a major contributor to greenhouses gases through heavy use of fossil fuels, poses an unknown health risk through genetic modification of crops, replaces localized economic risk with systemic economic instability and forces millions of people into labor ‘competition’ in rigged labor ‘markets.’¶ The issues of nominal importance to political progressives and liberals are here—potentially catastrophic global warming, a global food supply forcibly compromised through untested modification of its fundamental constituents, reliance on fossil fuels, economic inequality and the destruction of sustainable economic practices. Liberal economist Paul Krugman and President Barack Obama are both vocal proponents of the ‘free-trade’ policies behind these outcomes while also proposing that ‘something should be done’ to clean up the rolling catastrophes that their economics produce. But why if radical capitalism is ‘reasonable’ would progressive and liberal cohorts find the outcomes unreasonable– why flail about for ineffective solutions rather than stopping these problems before they arise?¶ The reason why from the perspective of Western academics is that actual economic history has been replaced with the canard that people in their ‘natural’ state have no economic existence. Neo-liberals permanently point to the economic circumstances that capitalism (and other forms of economic imperialism) create, such as that of the Mexican farmers displaced by radically destructive U.S. agricultural practices via ‘free-trade’ predation, as the ‘natural state’ of humanity that capitalists then claim that capitalism is the solution to. If it weren’t for the Mequiladoras and the work they provide, goes the argument; those poor, ignorant people would be naked, rolling in the dirt, too stupid to feed themselves. And the role of a ‘good’ liberal / progressive is to provide them with a job making genetically modified death burgers for less than subsistence wages.

### Impact – economic imperialism = extinction

Economic imperialism has a history of slavery violence and creates the conditions for looming environmental catastrophe

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Free Trade and Economic Imperialism Economic Progress Toward Ecological Suicide WEEKEND EDITION NOVEMBER 30-32, 2012

¶ Economic imperialism has a long history—colonialism, neo-colonialism and modern corporate extraction through new and historical colonial channels, which contemporary mainstream economists appear to have no knowledge of. This is more likely than not why trade economists can write about ‘free-trade’ without tying actual trade relations to imperial history. Progressives and liberals hope to moderate the worst effects of capitalism without admitting their historical roles as facilitators of imperial predation. And contemporary liberals are proponents of the most radical forms of capitalism ever conceived—just consider which self-described liberals win the ‘Nobel’ prize in economics (it is actually a banker awarded prize having nothing to do with a choice of the Nobel Committee) and then take an actual look at their trade economics.¶ Looming global environmental catastrophe renders the last several hundred years of Western economic theory dubious, if not outright suicidal. Economic ‘progress’ that increases dependence on unsustainable economic practices produces catastrophe in increasing proportion to the benefits that even proponents claim will result. But the great thinkers behind modern trade theory appear to have no knowledge of this paradox. For their own benefit, as progressives would have it, why not ‘free’ the economics departments at Princeton and Harvard to compete with displaced peasant farmers serving genetically modified death burgers for $7 per hour? GDP would certainly rise as a result.

### Impact - sovereignty

**The alternative is critical to fashioning new models of sovereignty**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

There are many implications for IR from this position, most of which I have yet to think-through, but perhaps the most important is the question of sovereignty. The colonial encounter between indigenous people and the conquistadores did not take place between states – the indigenous polities were complex systems but they weren’t states in the Westphalian sense, and Cristobal Colón was an adventurer backed by a royal family and the Catholic Church, while the slave trade was a commercial enterprise in the main, among both Africans and Europeans. At present, these engagements are invisible to IR. Yet if we are to accord these encounters with the portent and impact that they deserve, we need to find a way to think of these as encounters between social agents acting in coherent groups – as being polities. This involves separating ‘sovereignty’ from the idea of the state. Here, some IR scholars have paved my way by exploring the particular origins of state sovereignty and in revealing the cultural particularity of the ‘hegemonologue’, to quote Marshall Beier[[8]](#footnote-8). Native Americanists in particular reveal its use as a power-tool of oppression and provide insight into alternative cosmologies of sovereignty. Thus Peter d’Errico’s work demonstrates how the legalistic device of sovereignty-as-fenceable-property in the USA dispossessed native peoples of land which was theirs and confined them to state-appointed places[[9]](#footnote-9). Soren Larsen, on the other hand, reveals an alternative notion of sovereignty within the Dakelh people of British Columbia who understand ‘our territory’ (or *keyah*) as ‘the area in which one walks’, linking it to a physical and emotional belonging to the landscape associated with the tasks of maintaining trails, trap-lines and shelters[[10]](#footnote-10). Contesting the boundaries of the sovereign state, as well as the empisteme which is woven into its very identity and institutional fabric, is also a central goal for many indigenous movements in the southern Americas. The struggle for autonomy, the ascendance of non-European languages, legal systems and religions, and the denunciation of oppressive and racist practices at the heart of Latin America’s nation states challenges their existence as territorial and institutional entities which claim the legitimacy of sovereignty. This clearly has significant implications for the theory and practice of international relations.

### African intersection internal

**The history of slavery is bound to the American relationship to indigenous peoples of north america**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

Taking a view of international relationships from the long sixteenth century also redirects our attention to another world-transforming experience played out in the Americas – transatlantic slavery – and the closely associated yet surprisingly overlooked issue of racism[[11]](#footnote-11). Transatlantic slavery developed because the indigenous women and men of the Americas, enslaved to service the conquistadores, had been decimated by brutality, slaughter and disease. Enslaved Africans were then caught up in the coloniality/modernity whirlwind by the demands of capitalist expansion and in turn their experience further deepened and spread its impact. The consequences of slavery profoundly shaped the contemporary world order, not only in terms of the massive population movements, the establishment of slave societies and the social holocaust in Africa, and not only for its intimate role in generating and sustaining the European industrial revolution and enduring patterns of global capitalism. It was also a central plank of coloniality/modernity’s normative framework and the hidden racialisations of liberalism[[12]](#footnote-12). ¶ Taking an Americas perspective places slavery centre-stage in world politics and history. To do so asks big questions of an IR – especially the mainstream kind – which seldom takes race seriously. Moreover, it marks slavery as an Americas-wide phenomenon and, if we look closer, as a highly variable one. It is overlooked by many – including Latin Americanists – that slavery made a significant impact on Latin American society. By 1800 slaves were not only a majority of Brazilian society but large Black populations also existed in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela, and significant populations developed in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay[[13]](#footnote-13). African slaves were central to the development of capitalism in Latin America: their forced labour produced the goods for international trade, but they also worked as enslaved petty entrepreneurs and fought in the wars of independence, some rising to the rank of General[[14]](#footnote-14). If nation states of the Westphalian model were being forged in Latin America, Afro-descendants were integral to this process. The position of Africans in the Americas is complex from a postcolonial point of view, in that they are neither colonizer nor colonized. Well, they are colonizers in that they are not *originario* or original peoples and they are integral to the operation of capitalist modernity. Yet they clearly occupy a subordinated and racialised position in the global hierarchy which stems from the sense (and sometimes the reality) of absolute domination by the ‘master’ – a kind of individualised colonization. The complexity of the patterns of domination is still significantly under-theorised, in my view, and I’m not sure that I am the one to do it. But at the very least, understanding that there are at least two ‘others’ in this colonial scenario breaks down the binary of colonizer/colonized which continues to characterise a lot of postcolonial thinking and so easily writes-out less obvious colonial experiences[[15]](#footnote-15).

## Alternatives

### Alternative – starting point

**Alternative viewpoints from the perspective of the colonial borderlands is critical to a better understanding of latin america**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

An alternative starting point for thinking about the global through Latin America is the idea of coloniality which draws on the work of Peruvian Aníbal Quijano and Argentinian Walter Mignolo[[16]](#footnote-16). It is framed by an important body of critical thinking emerging from Latin America itself, including intellectual movements of the 1890s (Cuban José Martí) and the 1930s (Peruvian Mariátegui), as well as dependency theory (Cardoso and Falleto) and liberation philosophy (Dussel, Galeano), plus the work of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group[[17]](#footnote-17). Coloniality has also been inspired by indigenous political action and philosophies which have emerged particularly since the mid-1990s. These include the Zapatistas in Mexico and the indigenous movement in Bolivia, which has generated a radical government under Evo Morales who took over the presidency in 2005[[18]](#footnote-18).¶ Conventionally, colonialism is seen as a phase *preceding* modernity, but Mignolo and others argue that coloniality is entwined with, and part of, modernity, it is its hitherto unacknowledged face[[19]](#footnote-19). Like modernity, coloniality is both the term for a social condition and the name of an on-going process and relationship. Particularly, Mignolo shows how modernity/coloniality is founded on a racialised relationship which stretches from the global to the national, local and intimate arenas. For him, ‘international’ encounters (in what Mary Louise Pratt calls the ‘contact zone’ between culturally distinct peoples) mould identities and notions of difference which justify inequality and capitalist exploitation[[20]](#footnote-20). As such, the colonization of the Americas is not seen as merely a rehearsal for the ‘main event’ of colonialism (nineteenth century imperialism in Africa and Asia), it is a foundation-stone of the contemporary world order. Mignolo places ‘the global’ at the heart of his understanding of ‘America’ (and ‘Europe’), indeed “the very idea of America cannot be separated from coloniality: the entire continent emerged as such in the European consciousness as a massive extent of land to be appropriated and of people to be converted to Christianity, and whose labour could be exploited”[[21]](#footnote-21). ¶ More than that, coloniality is not over. As Moraña, Dussel and Jáuregui explain, it “encompasses the transhistoric expansion of colonial domination and the perpetuation of its effects in contemporary times”. As such, it is still a profoundly influential – and international – dynamic of power[[22]](#footnote-22). For original peoples across the region, the colonial era has not ended, its core episteme and practice has merely been consolidated through a regime of independent settlers[[23]](#footnote-23). For native people, placing the colonial experience at the centre of an understanding of the world is important to recapture the political agenda and to open up supposedly ‘settled’ and ‘universal’ norms, such as: the need for development; the primacy of the individual; the subordination of nature; the desirability of liberal democracy. This knowledge-challenge is not a theoretical exercise, but a political strategy being put into practice. As scholars, our eyes and thoughts are drawn towards the experience of original peoples who have been most oppressed by coloniality/modernity, yet because this powerful conjunction is all encompassing, and if we follow Mignolo, coloniality/modernity *also* moulds people from across the racial and economic spectrum. In this way, the creole business woman is as caught up in coloniality/modernity as a mixed race African/Aymara/Jewish/Spanish tango singer. Indeed, if we follow this line of thinking – ¶ that coloniality is an integral element of modernity – then this idea has global relevance, conditioning ideas and actions far beyond the Americas and Europe.

### Alternative solvency

**The alternative’s viewpoint is critical to a recognition of agency for latin america**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

It is this unsettling of this supposedly settled settler society – the raising of questions about its colonialist relationships and the acknowledgement of its contingency – which is Latin America’s most powerful critique of its dominant neighbour. Latin America exposes the frailty of the USA not through an attack on its imperialist pretentions, then, but by revealing its coloniality within. The profound critique of sovereignty which emerges from engagement with Native American history and philosophy, strikes at one of the foundations of ‘actually existing’ IR in many of its formats, as the incisive work of Beier and Inayatullah and Blaney so ably demonstrates. Opening up the USA as a place of curiosity and contingency, as a place that is uneven and highly contested, serves to challenge many of the normative assumptions found on the pages of IR textbooks and the policy documents of international politics. If I might take for granted – here at the Millennium conference – that puncturing the discursive armour of oppressive universalist thinking is an important political project, then Latin America is not a peripheral actor in this struggle, but rather occupies a vital strategic location from which to critique IR precisely because of its close relationship to IR’s heartland – the USA. At the very least, looking past the dazzling power of the US helps us to catch a glimpse of the other global stories of this mighty, colonial place.

### Alt solvency - mexico

The alternative draws from the knowledge base of the Zapatista movement as an otward expression of exposure and transcendence of the violence of coloniality

**Harvey 2005** [Neil, associate professor of government at new mexico state university and the author of chiapas rebellion: the struggle for land and democracy, “inclusion through autonomy: zapatistsas and dissent. September october issue NACLA report on the americas.

With Empire, dissent does not emanate from a space that is "outside" the global capital- ist system (that is, in the sense of combating the imposition of a foreign power, for example), but rather it is located "inside" the system. Empire does not have an outside, so any alliances of political dissent must be made with the same goal in mind; to expose and tran- scend Empire, rather than reform national gov-¶ ernments. Under this analysis, it no longer makes sense to talk about "national liberation." Hardt and Negri add that the way we think about dissent has also shifted away from the idea of a unified people to a greater emphasis on diver- sity From their perspective, this change opens up greater possibilities for more novel and creative forms of political dissent. In doing so, value is placed on the uniqueness of each person and group as they confront Empire in their own ways. The unified "people" tums out to be a diverse "multitude" with little desire or need for centralized organ- ization and leadership.5¶ Are the Zapatistas an expression of the multitude? Some authors have adopted this line of argument. Mexico-based scholar John HoUoway for example, stresses the Zapatistas"¶ search for a different approach to politics itself,^ Rather than seeking power for themselves, the Zapatistas call on all peopie to construct new spaces for dialogue where the dignity of each is upheld. Their strategy is not to seize power and wield it over others, but to democratize power relations in every sphere of society This, continues Holloway, will retnam an "uncertain revolution" in which defini- tions, programs and theories will always be dis- placed by the ambiguities and contradictions of any social movement. The novelty is that the Zapatistas have recognized this uncertainty and, with a strong dose of irony, have turned it into one of their main¶ sources of strength. In Holloways words, "The tZapatista] revolution is a moving outwards rather. than a moving towards,"'' By this he means ihat the¶ Zapatistas seek alliances in the construction of a broad and flexible agenda for social change, rather than claim to know in advance the final point towards which all actions should be directed.

### Alt – critical utopia solvency

**The plan replicates the conservative utopia of neoliberalism – the alternative generates a utopia out of negativity and refusal of the status quo neoliberal utopia**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

The utopian dimension of the WSF consists in claiming the existence of alternatives to neoliberal globalization. As Franz Hinkelammert says, we live in a time of conservative utopias whose utopian character resides in its radical denial of alternatives to present-day reality. The possibility of alternatives is discredited precisely for being utopian, idealistic, unrealistic. All conservative utopias are sustained by a political logic based on one sole efficiency criterion that rapidly becomes a supreme ethical criterion. According to this criterion, only what is efficient has value. Any other ethical criterion is devalued as inefficient. Neoliberalism is one such conservative utopia for which the sole criterion of efficiency is the market or the laws of the market. Its utopian character resides in the promise that its total fulfillment or application cancels out all utopias. As Hinkelammert says, “this ideology derives from its frantic anti-utopianism, the utopian promise of a new world. The basic thesis is: whoever destroys utopia, fulfills it” (2002: 278). What distinguishes conservative utopias from critical utopias is the fact that they identify¶ 9¶ themselves with the present-day reality and discover their utopian dimension in the radicalization or complete fulfillment of the present. Moreover the problems or difficulties of present-day reality are not the consequence of the deficiencies or limits of the efficiency criteria, but result rather from the fact that the application of the efficiency criteria has not been thorough enough. If there is unemployment and social exclusion, if there is starvation and death in the periphery of the world system, that is not the consequence of the deficiencies or limits of the laws of the market; it results rather from the fact that such laws have not yet been fully applied. The horizon of conservative utopias is thus a closed horizon, an end to history.¶ This is the context in which the utopian dimension of the WSF must be understood. The WSF signifies the reemergence of a critical utopia, that is to say, the radical critique of present-day reality and the aspiration to a better society. This occurs, however, when the anti-utopian utopia of neoliberalism is dominant. The specificity of the utopian content of this new critical utopia, when compared with that of the critical utopias prevailing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, thus becomes clear. The anti-utopian utopia of neoliberalism is grounded on two presuppositions: the illusion of total control over present-day reality by means of extremely efficient powers and knowledges; and the radical rejection of alternatives to the status quo. The WSF puts in question the totality of control (whether as knowledge or power) only to affirm credibly the possibility of alternatives. Hence the open nature, vague if you will, of alternatives. In a context in which the conservative utopia prevails absolutely, it is more important to affirm the possibility of alternatives than to define them. The utopian dimension of the WSF consists in affirming the possibility of a counter-hegemonic globalization. In other words, the utopia of the WSF asserts itself more as negativity (the definition of what it critiques) than as positivity (the definition of that to which it aspires).

This utopia creates practical and ethical politics – it is not a vague opening, but a method to create consolidation of agents against neoliberalism

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

The utopia of the WSF is a radically democratic utopia. It is the only realistic utopia after a century of conservative utopias, some of them the result of perverted critical utopias. This utopian design, grounded on the denial of the present rather than the definition of the future, focused on the processes of intercourse among the movements rather than an assessment of the movements’ political content, is the major factor of cohesion of the WSF. It helps to maximize what unites and minimize what divides, celebrate intercourse rather than dispute power, be a strong presence rather than an agenda. This utopian design, which is also an ethical design, privileges the ethical discourse, quite evident in the WSF’s Charter of Principles, aimed at gathering consensuses beyond the ideological and political cleavages among the movements and organizations that compose it. The movements and organizations put between brackets the cleavages that divide them, as much as is necessary to affirm the possibility of a counter-hegemonic globalization.¶ The nature of this utopia has been the most adequate for the initial objective of the WSF: to affirm the existence of a counter-hegemonic globalization. This is no vague utopia. It is rather a utopia that contains in itself the concretization that is adequate for this phase of the construction of counter-hegemonic globalization. It remains to be seen if the nature of this utopia is the most adequate one to guide the next steps, should there be any next steps. Once the counter-hegemonic globalization is consolidated, and hence the idea that another world is possible is made credible, will it be possible to fulfill this idea with the same level of radical democracy that helped formulate it? I shall come back to this.

### Alt – epistemological ethics

**Our alternative opens an epistemological praxis for the creation and motivation of alternative ethical coutnermovements against neoliberalism**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

Confronted with this situation, the epistemological alternative proposed by the WSF is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice. This alternative is grounded on two basic ideas. First, if the objectivity of science does not imply neutrality, science and technology may as well be put at the service of counter-hegemonic practices. The extent to which science is used is in general arguable inside the movements, and it may vary according to circumstances and practices. Second, whatever the extent to which science is resorted to, counter-hegemonic practices are mainly practices of nonscientific knowledges, practical, often tacit knowledges that must be made credible to render such practices credible in turn.¶ This second point is more polemical because it confronts the hegemonic concepts of truth and efficiency directly. The epistemological denunciation that the WSF engages in consists in showing that the concepts of rationality and efficiency presiding over hegemonic technical-scientific knowledge are too restrictive to capture the richness and diversity of the social experience of the world, and specially that they discriminate against practices of resistance and production of counter-hegemonic alternatives. Hegemonic rationality and efficiency thus bring about a contraction of the world by concealing or discrediting all the practices, agents, and knowledges that are not accounted for by their criteria. The concealment and discrediting of these practices constitute a waste of social experience, both social experience that is already available but not yet visible, and social experience not yet available but realistically possible.¶ The epistemological operation carried out by the WSF consists of two processes that I designate as sociology of absences and sociology of emergences (Santos, 2002a). I mean sociologies built against hegemonic social sciences and upon alternative epistemological presuppositions. I speak of sociologies because my aim is critically to identify the conditions that destroy nonhegemonic and potentially counter-hegemonic social experience. Through the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences, social experience that resists destruction is unconcealed, and the space-time capable of identifying and rendering credible new counter-hegemonic social experiences is opened up.

### Alt – ecology of knowledge/a2 relativism

**The alternative fractures the logic of monoculture and creates a base for accepting incompleteness of knowledge while recognizing possibility for other forms, this is not relativism but is interruption of monologic of status quo thinking**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

The ecology of knowledges. The first logic, the logic of the monoculture of scientific knowledge and rigor, must be confronted with the identification of other knowledges and criteria of rigor that operate credibly in social practices. Such contextual credibility must be deemed a sufficient condition for the knowledge in question to have enough legitimacy to participate in epistemological debates with other knowledges, namely with scientific knowledge. The central idea of the sociology of absences in this regard is that there is no ignorance or knowledge in general. All ignorance is ignorant of a certain knowledge, and all knowledge is the overcoming of a particular ignorance (Santos, 1995: 25). This principle of incompleteness of all knowledges is the condition of the possibility of epistemological dialogue and debate among the different knowledges. What each knowledge contributes to such a dialogue is the way in which it leads a certain practice to overcome a certain ignorance. Confrontation and dialogue among knowledges is confrontation and dialogue among the different processes through which practices that are ignorant in different ways turn into practices that are knowledgeable in different ways. In this domain, the sociology of absences aims to substitute an ecology of knowledges for the monoculture of scientific knowledge. Such an ecology of knowledges permits not only to overcome the monoculture of scientific knowledge but also the idea that the nonscientific knowledges are alternatives to scientific knowledge. The idea of alternatives presupposes the idea of normalcy, and the latter the idea of norm, and so, nothing being further specified, the designation of something as an alternative carries a latent connotation of subalternity. If we take biomedicine and African traditional medicine as an example, it makes no sense to consider the latter, by far the predominant one in Africa, as an alternative to the former. The important thing is to identify the contexts and the practices in which each operates, and the way they conceive of health and sickness and overcome ignorance (as undiagnosed illness) in applied knowledge (as cure). Ecology of knowledges does not imply acceptance of relativism. On the contrary, from the point of view of a pragmatics of social emancipation, relativism, as absence of criteria of value hierarchies among knowledges, is an untenable position, because it renders impossible any relation between knowledge and the meaning of social transformation. If anything is of equal value as knowledge, all projects of social transformation are equally valid or, which means the same, equally invalid. The ecology of knowledges aims to create a new sort of relationship between scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge. It consists in granting “equality of opportunities” to the different kinds of knowledge engaged in ever broader epistemological disputes aimed at maximizing their respective contributions to build “another possible world,” that is to say, a more democratic and just society, as well as a more balanced society vis-à-vis nature. The point is not to ascribe equal validity to all kinds of knowledge, but rather to allow for a pragmatic discussion of alternative criteria of validity, which does not straightaway disqualify whatever does not fit the epistemological canon of modern science.

### Alt solves aff

**The alternative is not some inflexible refusal of all change but is an acceptance of the positivity of status quo countermovements to neoliberal expansion – plan shuts these down in favor of economic efficiency – only the alternative can resolve the aff’s concern with the area**

**Werner 2012** [Marion, Department of Geography University at Buffalo, SUNY *Contesting power/knowledge in economic geography: Learning from Latin America and the Caribbean*, *New Companion to Economic Geography* (Barnes, T., Peck, J., Sheppard, E., eds.), published july 2012

**¶** During the long decades of neoliberal counter-reforms in the region, these theoretical traditions were in retreat institutionally, and faced strong criticism from a transforming Left. Social movements and activist scholars challenged not only neoliberalism, but also the developmentalism that pervaded structuralist and dependency thinking (Chavez et al. 2008; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Slater 2004). Social movements emerging in the wake of market reforms reflected the uneven territoriality of states and capital accumulation, and the historical legacies of racism and colonialism that structured this unevenness (Quijano 2000). Movements created spaces of counter- hegemonic theory-making, renewing critiques of Latin American and Caribbean positionality from feminist, indigenous, African-descent, urban migrant, and peasant subject positions, and their combinations. From these hybrid subject positions, they opposed deepening forms of neoliberal capitalism, as evident, for example, in free trade agreements that privileged market agendas of the North and the sectors of capital that could capture returns from these reforms in the South. The Zapatistas in southern Mexico, for example, created and defended autonomous non-market spaces, notions of radical democracy, and indigenous subjectivity in the face of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and its emboldened assault on already imperiled forms of collective land tenure and public goods. In diverse ways, movements against the privatization of water in Bolivia, mobilizations by the unemployed, or piqueteros, pauperized by currency crises in Argentina, and the landless people’s movement in Brazil, signaled the growth of resistance to dispossession wrought by neoliberalism.¶ Since the late 1990s, extensive organizing and resistance to neoliberalism in Latin America and the Caribbean have brought political parties and leaders with strong reformist agendas to power through democratic elections across the region. In Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador, the locus of enunciation of counter-hegemonic thought and practice is now, in part, being assumed by the state. Many governments are seeking ways to either reverse or rework the neoliberal paradigm, and, especially in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (at the time of writing), to address the legacies of racism and colonialism that have structured the national state through the marginalization and exclusion of indigenous and African-descent peoples. Turning the tide of dispossession and reconstructing urban and rural livelihood possibilities are all on the agenda of a political opening some have called “post-neoliberalism” (Sader 2008). States and social movements face the task of re-making economic and political geographies through new and renewed paradigms of sovereignty, autonomous development, solidarity, and radical democracy. Programs of social and economic change under new banners such as neostructuralism, Amazonic-Andean capitalism and 21st century socialism draw their lineages in part from the region’s tradition of counter- hegemonic thought (Bielschowsky 2006; Romo 2007; Leiva 2008; Ferrer 2010). The contradictions and complexities of these projects are all the more reason to engage with these transformations and ask what can be learned about de-centering economic geography from these experiences.

### Alternative – revolutionary consciousness

The alternative ethic enables a recognition of power and equality across multiple layers of domination

Francis **Shor 2012**, professor wayne state Twentieth Century US Social-Cultural History, U.S. Economic Imperialism and Resistance from the Global South: A Prelude to OWS, Summer 2012 Vol:XIV-1, Whole #: 53

Beyond the connections the Zapatistas have established on the global stage, they have also continued to build those autonomous spaces and communities in the state of Chiapas. As pointed out by Ryan Hollon and Karen Lopez, the "Zapatistas view their efforts as part of a struggle to support all those indigenous communities living in a shared context of poverty and isolation." Among those autonomous spaces are learning communities and health facilities that both supplant the state and contest its authority. Expanding their culture of resistance, the Zapatistas have managed to sustain their own indigenous communities while building the kind of radical democratic structures that are an inspiration to those seeking another and better world.¶ Certainly, the conditions in Mexico that produced the EZLN are important to recognize, as well as the transformations and efficacy of the Zapatistas various campaigns in that country. However, the message, in particular, of Subcomandante Marcos resonated globally, especially as a project of a radically democratic and diverse political alternative to U.S. economic imperialism and global capital. Marcos deliberately played with a kind of shape-shifting universal oppressed person, especially evident in the following communiqué:¶ Marcos is gay in San Francisco, a black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Isidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, an indigenous person in the streets of San Cristobal...In other words, Marcos is a human being in this world. Marcos is every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is resisting and saying "Enough!"¶ While embracing those who were despised and marginalized, both Marcos and the Zapatistas made clear their insistence that they sought mutual solidarity. The Zapatistas called for joining forces around the globe in a common, but diverse, endeavor for insurrection. For Marcos, the rebellion promoted by the Zapatistas was an invitation to listen to a¶ network of voices...a network that covers the five continents and helps to resist the death promised to us by Power....There follows the reproduction of resistances, the I do not conform, the I rebel. There follows the world with many worlds which the world needs. There follows humanity recognizing itself to be plural, different, inclusive, tolerant of itself, with hope.¶ The network of voices inspired by Marcos and the Zapatistas certainly led to the articulation of shared resistance and mutual solidarity perhaps most succinctly articulated in the slogan of "One No, Many Yeses!" Seeking ways to valorize that resistance and mutual solidarity, the Zapatistas provided a critical voice in their national intervention against U.S. economic imperialism and global neoliberalism. Beyond that intervention, they offered a new way of connecting to a vision and practice of globalization from below. By invoking a global consciousness for the excluded, the Zapatistas opened up the possibility of projecting another world or even other worlds where dignity would reign. As noted by Fiona Jeffries,

## 2nc Answer to Answer blocks

### A2: Affirmative Framework interpretations

**The affirmative framework argument positions the judge as a gatekeeper of acceptable knowledge to civilize the debate round to only allow forms of education preferential to western epistemologies**

**Baker 2009** [Michael, [University of Rochester](http://rochester.academia.edu/), [Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development](http://rochester.academia.edu/Departments/Warner_Graduate_School_of_Education_and_Human_Development), Graduate Student, Situating Modern Western Education within the Modern/colonial World System, Unpublished Paper ,June 2009 , academia.edu

The civilizing alterization experience of Latin America offers a way of thinking differently about the politics and ethics of knowledge, language, and education relevant to the experiences and histories of all locations within the modern/colonial world system, including the system’s origin and center – Western Europe and North America. ¶ The “discovery” of America and the genocide of Indians and African slaves are the very foundations of “modernity,” more so than the French or Industrial Revolutions. Better yet, they constitute the darker and hidden face of modernity, “coloniality.” Thus, to excavate the “idea of Latin America” is, really to understand how the West was born and how the modern world order was founded. (Mignolo, 2005, p. xiii)¶ ¶ The missionary, the teacher, the anthropologist, and the tourist are examples of roles and identities that continue to embody the colonial heritage of framing otherness in ways that subalternize difference (Spivak, 1999). The secondary school teacher for example, as an embassador for Eurocentric knowledge, professionally frames his or her engagement with students, in terms of ‘enlightenment’, acquisition of, and assimilation into the priviledged knowledge/world of western civilization, i.e., “cultural literacy”. ¶ *Civilization is an idea that we learned in school. Further, it is an elitist idea, one that is defined by creating hierarchies – of societies, of classes, of cultures, or of races. For the elites who coined the idea, civilizations are always class-stratified, state-based societies, and civilized peoples always belong to those classes whose privileged existences are guaranteed by the institutions and practices of the state. (Patterson, 1997, pp. 9-10) ¶ ¶* The defining myth of Eurocentric modernity is the claim that European culture was “superior and more developed” and that the culture of the Other was “inferior, crude, barbaric, and culpably immature” (Dussel, 1993). “…modernity as such was ‘born’ when Europe was in a position to pose itself against an other, when in other words, Europe could constitute itself as a unified ego exploring, conquering, colonizing an alterity that gave back its image of itself” (Dussel, 1993, p. ). This construction of European identity is linked with racial myths of civilizational superiority and the construction of otherness within an adversarial system of world-views (Delanty, 1995; Poliakox, 1974; Sardar, Nandy & Wyn Davies, 1993; Maldonado-Torres, 2008). European civilizational identity formation is also based upon the creation of a positive (epistemic and hermeneutic) foundation for the self, which Foucault traces back to the fifth century Christian monasteries (Foucault, 1993). ¶ I think that one of the great problems of Western culture has been to find the possibility of founding a hermeneutics of the self, not as it was the case in early Christianity, on the sacrifice of the self but, on the contrary, on a positive, on the theoretical and practical, emergence of the self. That was the aim of the juridical institutions, that was the aim also of medical and psychiatric practices, that was the aim of political and philosophical theory – to constitute the ground of the subjectivity as the root of the positive self, what we could call the permanent anthropologism of Western thought. (Foucault, 1993, p. 222) ¶ ¶ This positive knowledge conception of the Christian self became the foundation for the modern concept of the civilized “man”, upon which the “civilization-savagism paradigm” was constructed and implemented (Adams, 1988). ¶ This new world system of European alterization within which modern western schooling was constructed and is maintained emerged in the fifteenth century when the world became an imaginable whole with European “discovery” of the Americas. Along with the initial joining together of all places and peoples of the earth in the first worldwide system came the geocultural narrative of western civilization as the most advanced form of life on the planet. The continued official *commemoration* of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the Americas in the Unites States and Spain, for example, illustrates the powerful hold this mythical macronarrative maintains in the Eurocentric collective imaginary. Situating the “problem of universal history”, Max Weber articulates this self-understanding of the superiority of western civilization. ¶ To what combination of circumstances should the fact be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value (Weber, 1958, p. 13).¶ ¶ Eurocentric modernity interprets modernity as exclusively European, denying and obscuring this self-constituting process of alterization along with the comparative advantages for political-economic development and world power relations resulting from European colonialism (Blaut, 1992; Dussel, 1996, 1998). According to this Eurocentric perspective, “Europe had exceptional *internal* characteristics that allowed it to supersede, through its rationality, all other cultures (Dussel, 1998a). Until 1960s, this Eurocentric interpretation of modernity was the largely unquestioned cultural-narrative background in the social and political imaginary of the modern/colonial world-system. Latin America, for example, was only understood as an ontological, geo-political entity in the “objective” world order. This macronarrative of western civilization first emerged in the Renaissance and consolidated during the Enlightenment, and is today tied to contemporary historiography of the Renaissance and the philosophy of the Enlightenment (Mignolo, 2000a). In the nineteenth century, various German philosophers ensured its extension into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, i.e., Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger (Dussel, 1996; Maldonado-Torres, 2005; Mignolo, 2008). ¶ Western civilization is supposed to be something “grounded” in Greek history as is also Western metaphysics. This reading, implicit in the Renaissance, became explicit in the Enlightenment. Occidentalism is basically the master metaphor of colonial discourse since the sixteenth century… (Mignolo, 2000a, p. 327)

### A2: Affirmative Framework interpretations

**Refuse the affirmative’s framework – creating new notions of acceptability of knowledge are critical to challenging the basis of western hegemony in thinking**

**Baker 2009** [Michael, [University of Rochester](http://rochester.academia.edu/), [Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development](http://rochester.academia.edu/Departments/Warner_Graduate_School_of_Education_and_Human_Development), Graduate Student, Situating Modern Western Education within the Modern/colonial World System, Unpublished Paper ,June 2009 , academia.edu

The modern/colonial world system perspective is part of an alternative macronarrative of the contemporary world that reframes the ways the modern world is interpreted and lived. This essay argues that western consciousness and western education are largely contained within a universalistic, hierarchical, racialized narrative of civilization and that these universalistic assumptions are obstacles to the recognition of the ontological and epistemic equality of other ways of being human. As a central institution within this ongoing western civilizational project, “modern” education possesses a natural, tacit, or taken for granted relationship with the project of Eurocentric modernity. A more critically conscious historical-theoretical interpretation of “modern” education requires a planetary and relational understanding of modernity, beyond the western civilizational projection. ¶ The emergence and expansion of western civilization from the sixteenth century to the present day involves the formation and successive transformations of a pedagogical project aimed at civilizing humanity through language indoctrination, instructional discipline, and the imposition of ways of knowing and being, all contained within universalized presumptions of “man.” The conceptualization and practice of western education has been and continues to be one of the primary institutions in the “building of Western civilization” (Butts, 1967, 1973). As modern/colonial institutions, state education systems are part of a long history of redemptive-civilizing missions within the expansion of Eurocentric modernity (Mignolo, 2000a). The histories, ideologies, organization, practices, contents, and consequences of modern schooling around the world are profoundly interrelated (Swaan, 1988). ¶ The modern/colonial world-system perspective provides a geo-historically grounded critique of the way western knowledge and education systems continue to serve the processes of cultural colonization in both metropolitan and postcolonial nation-states. Seemingly universal and neutral processes of teaching and learning are profoundly embedded within western colonial discourses that acculturate and stratify individuals according to a universalized system of difference constructed from a homogenous and disguised cultural center. This essay argues that the modern/colonial world system perspective provides a more adequate framework for interpreting and teaching about modern education than does the framework of Eurocentric modernity. ¶ As an intellectual and social movement to think and live beyond Eurocentric modernity, the modern/colonial world system perspective is not presented as a new paradigm for social science in the linear and progressive “history” of modernity. The modern/colonial world system perspective is an alternative (decolonial) paradigm for interpreting and understanding the world in opposition to the dominant “imperial paradigm.” ¶ … the imperial paradigm imposes and maintains the dominant view (which all students learn from elementary to high school and which is disseminated in popular culture and the media). The decolonial paradigm struggles to bring into intervening existence an-other interpretation that brings forward, on the one hand, a silenced view of the event and, on the other, shows the limits of imperial ideology disguised as the true (and total) interpretation of events. (Mignolo, 2005, p. 33) ¶ The “imperial paradigm” is a regime of truth that constructed the ways in which the world and societies are known and understood through the categories of knowledge embedded in modern/imperial European languages rooted in Greek and Latin (Mignolo, 2005, p. xviii). ¶ The modern/colonial world system perspective interprets western modernity as a civilizational complex established in part through a Eurocentric model of power/knowledge relations that emerged in the sixteenth century. Eurocentric modernity is interpreted as a universalized civilizational project that centrally involves western educational institutions and the imposition of Eurocentric forms of knowing and being. Until modernity is interpreted from the perspective of coloniality, western education (conservative and liberal) will remain embedded within the tacit presuppositions of Eurocentric modernity. The modern/colonial world system perspective offers a critique of Eurocentric education and points toward an educational theory and practice that is no longer contained within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality. ¶ Alternatives to Eurocentric modernity are necessary today in the face of the interrelated neo-liberal and neo-conservative projects to reassert the colonial power/knowledge relations of Eurocentric modernity through the formation of a global market civilization (Brown, 2003, 2006; Gill, 2003). Creating alternatives to Eurocentric modernity involves breaking out of and resituating the hegemony of Eurocentric knowledge production and learning, through the recognition and revaluation of the epistemological diversity of the world.

### Judge should evaluate Epistemology first

Evaluating the epistemology of the affirmative plan is a prerequisite to understanding its outcomes and ethics

**Grosfoguel 2005** [Ramon, associate professor in the department of ethnic studies at the university of California at Berkeley, Critical Globalization Studies, edited by Richard Appelbaum and William Robinson 288-89 ]

So far, the history of the modern—colonial capitalist patriarchal world-system has privileged the culture, knowledge, and epistemology produced by the West (Spivak, 1988; Mignolo, 2000). No culture in the world remained untouched by European modernity. There is no absolute outside to this system. The monologism and mono-topic global design of the West relates to other cultures and peoples from a position of superiority and is deaf toward the cosmologies and epistemologies of the non-Western world. The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the so-called savages • and barbarians in the sixteenth century, followed by the imposition of "white man's burden" and "civilizing mission" in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the imposition of the "developmentalist project" in the twentieth century and, more recently, the imperial project of military interventions under the rhetoric of democracy and human rights in the twenty-first century, have all been imposed by militarism and violence. Two responses to the Eurocentric colonial imposition are Third World nationalisms and fundamentalisms. Nationalism provides Eurocentric solutions to a Eurocentric global problem. It reproduces an internal coloniality of power within each nation-state and reifies the nation-state as the privileged location of social change (Grosfoguel, 1996). Struggles above and below the nation-state are not considered in nationalist political strategies. Moreover, nationalist responses to global capitalism reinforce the nation-state as the political institutional form per excellence of the modern—colonial capitalist patriarchal world-system. In this sense, nationalism is complicit with Eurocentric thinking and political structures. On the other hand, Third World fundamentalisms of different kinds respond with an essentialist "pure outside space" or "absolute exteriority" to modernity. They are antimodern forces that reproduce the binary oppositions of Eurocentric thinking. They respond to the imposition of Eurocentric modernity with an antimodernity that is as hierarchical, authoritarian, and antidemocratic as the former. A plausible solution to the Eurocentric vs. fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter Mignolo, following Chicana thinkers such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987), calls "critical border thinking" (Mignolo, 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting the institutions of modernity and retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies redefines modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference. What border thinking produces is a redefinition of citizenship, democracy, human rights, and humanity, beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not antimodern; it is the modern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity

### A2 Aff says “K alt cedes the political”

The focus on politics proper ignores the ability of the alternative to have effects across the political spectrum and misunderstands the need for new types of political organization

*Maria* **Misoczky and Flores 2012** *[Ceci Misoczky* Professora Adjunta no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul¶ *and Rafael Kruter Flores,* Doutorando em Administração no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Contributions of Latin American revolutionary intellectuals for the study of the organization of liberating struggles¶ REBELA, v. 2, n. 1, jun. 2012

In a different direction, we are convinced that the focus on the organization of social anti-capitalist struggles is a relevant academic praxis, because it opposes the hegemonic definition of organization (as a synonym of enterprise) in a context of worldwide dominance of the managerial discourse. The aim is to produce counter-hegemonic knowledge in the very space where the hegemonic managerial discourse is produced and reproduced, and to contribute for the emancipation of OS (or at least ofe the parts of OS which intend to be critical) from the hegemony of management. We believe, with Neuhaus and Calello (2006, p. 2), that researches may “be critical interventions, both in the spaces where they are done - where potential forces of resistance to the hegemonic power are concentrated; and in the researchers themselves”.¶ The first step to widen the ways in which we study requires the abandonment of restrictive understandings of organization as a unit of analysis (Cooke, 2004 and 2010; Dar, 2008). Cooper and Burell (1988, p. 106) and Böhm (2005) had already indicated the direction of an expanded conception of organization as an ongoing process “that occurs within the wider ‘body’ of society”. In our research group, we have been exploring alternative ways of defining organization in order to deal with our focus of interest - the organization of social struggles. Organizations have been conceived as the collective inter-subjective act which is, simultaneously, a means for the praxis of liberation and a learning space for the experimentation of organizational practices compatible with liberating struggles (MISOCZKY, 2010).¶ As part of this research project we felt the need to engage with the thought of Latin American intellectuals. The fact that the development of OS in Latina America can be understood as a distorted version of the functionalist or the critical thought of the Centre has already been recognized. Despite such dominance scholars often express the uncomfortable sense that such approaches do not really explain what happens in their countries, while acknowledging that these frameworks give them recognition in the international arena, which is another way to say that to be allowed in you must deny your own identity (IBARRA- COLADO, 2006).¶ We can say, using the expression of Schwarz (1992), that the hegemonic version of Latin American and Brazilian OS is made of texts which do not express marks of location, which do not offer reflections about the peculiarities of our space of enunciation or about how social and institutional contexts limit and condition the production of ideas. But this is not truth concerning the wider critical (often revolutionary) intellectual Latin American production, marked by a vast and rich cultural tradition.¶ When we mention the Latin American cultural tradition or social thought we are opposing the construction of Latin America as an object of representation. This last expression means, for Moraña (1998), an image that defines its existence through the watching eyes, as the place of the other – an exotic pre-theoretical marginal place when confronted with metropolitan discourses. Instead, we are stating the existence of a creative, original and autonomous tradition, resulting from processes of transculturation.

This means you still elevate the alternative as being uniquely important as it categorizes a new possibility for interactions in politics

*Maria* **Misoczky and Flores 2012** *[Ceci Misoczky* Professora Adjunta no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul¶ *and Rafael Kruter Flores,* Doutorando em Administração no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Contributions of Latin American revolutionary intellectuals for the study of the organization of liberating struggles¶ REBELA, v. 2, n. 1, jun. 2012

Walter Benjamin (1989) conceived history as being crossed by two arrows always in tension. The first one is the historical time, continuous, empty, quantifiable, the eternal return of the same, of the mere survival, of progress, of the reproduction of the laws and myths of domination. The second transverses such order with the messianic time, which irrupts as creation and redemption. According to his critical thought the struggling class, the subjugated class, is the subject of historical knowledge. Therefore, in order to retell history we must take possession of remembrances as they happened in the moment of danger; it is an obligation to fix an image of the past as and when it was lived by the historical subject at the instant of danger.¶ For our purposes, this orientation induces the engagement with organic intellectuals committed to liberating struggles. This is the reason why we do not discriminate between intellectuals such as the ones involved in direct activism which produced testimonies of political rebellion against external aggressions, discrimination, marginality, and social injustices; and intellectuals which produced knowledge in solidarity with these struggles.¶ Therefore, we construct this text in dialogue with the words of three organic intellectuals which were able to engage creatively with the European thought, producing political appropriations and new theoretical developments informed by their praxis:¶ José Carlos Mariátegui – a Peruvian responsible for an original thought which  connected Marxism and socialist traditions of the Andean indigenous peoples; Ernesto Che Guevara - a revolutionary humanist who develop proposals for the moment  of transition to socialism; Paulo Freire - an educator with ethic-critical consciousness who dedicated his life and  work for the politics of liberation.  In the following parts we establish a dialogue with their ideas in order to share, from our intellectual tradition, a different vision, from the US/UK/European one, of what means to be critical; and to discuss possible inspirations for those of us working in Latin America and interested in contributing to the political processes of liberation which happen around us.

### A2 che indicts

*Guevara’s faults don’t matter insofar as the underlying structure of his theory produced anticapitalist resistance*

*Maria* **Misoczky and Flores 2012** *[Ceci Misoczky* Professora Adjunta no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul¶ *and Rafael Kruter Flores,* Doutorando em Administração no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Contributions of Latin American revolutionary intellectuals for the study of the organization of liberating struggles¶ REBELA, v. 2, n. 1, jun. 2012

Che Guevara (2005b) also manifested against the *evil of bureaucratism*. Of course he had no theorization on that issue and it seems that he had no contact with Weber’s ideas. Che tended to consider bureaucracy as a transitory deformation derived from the lack of revolutionary consciousness and resulting in lack of inner motivation and interest in solving problems. Another cause for the emergence of bureaucratism would be the lack of organization: “attempting to destroy “guerrillaism” without sufficient administrative experience has produced dislocations and bottlenecks that unnecessarily curb the flow of information from below, as well as the instructions or orders emanating from the central apparatus”. The third cause would be “the lack of sufficiently developed technical knowledge to be able to make correct decisions on short notice”. It is evident the association of bureaucracy with the common sense of a dysfunctional administrative apparatus.

Having diagnosed the reasons of the *malady*, Che Guevara (2005b) recommendations to provide the cure were directed to overcome what he considered as the central problem: the need for organization. “To do so we must modify our style of work. We must prioritize problems, assigning each body and each decision-making level its particular task. We must establish the concrete relationships between each one of them and all the others, from the center of economic decision making to the last administrative unit, as well as the relationships among their different components — horizontally — until we establish all the interrelationships within the economy.” He also advocated for the development of a “political work with dogged determination to rid ourselves of the lack of internal motivation, that is, the lack of political clarity”. The means for achieving internal motivation would be “continuous education, through concrete explanations of the tasks, through instilling in administrative employees an interest in their work, and through the example set by the vanguard workers”; and “drastic measures to eliminate the parasites, whether it be those who conceal in their stance a deep enmity to socialist society, or those who are irremediably opposed to work”. Che also defended the need of correcting “the inferiority that comes from our lack of knowledge”, a goal to be achieved by means of concentrated and extensive educational efforts.

From the text above it is crystal clear the possible articulation between Che’s thoughts and OS. This connection includes not only an obvious agenda of studies and the inspiration we can have for thinking the relation between the individual and the collective in the organization of the struggles and in the transition for a new society, but also how we can contribute with social activists and organizations to overcome some of his misconceptions. It is very usual to hear activists, in Cuba and all around Latin American, reproducing that there is no risk of contamination when adopting managerial techniques typical of capitalist enterprises. In our studies we had contact with this proposition many times. At first we had problems in understanding how such naivety could be present in contexts where the understanding of capitalist relations and ideology were so competent. It was studying Che’s texts that we found the explanation for such widespread position. It becomes obvious the relevance of engaging critically with Che’s ideas, such engagement could contribute to overcome the mere reproduction of these ideas by social activists, alerting for their inevitable adverse consequences: to fight capitalism using its own instruments is doomed to failure.

# Aff Answers

### 2ac structure

**Note, this file does not write your 2ac for you but here are some guidelines to follow:**

A 2ac vs the K needs to have the elements of: POSTAL – (permutation, offense, solvency deficit, theory, alternative inefficacy, and link minimization) at greater length the “why” behind each of these will be discussed during different lectures. That order is also the order that your 2ac should do it in beginning with permutations.

#1 - permutation

Permutation – do both.

[reminder that an acceptable permutation of the plan and alternative most include all of the plan and some or all of the alternative only, all else would be intrinsic or severance]

permutation – do the plan and all noncompetitive parts of the alternative

[this provides you some options against strategically worded alternatives that would be textually nonpermutable]

if you win this argument then a combination of your plan and the alternative is the best option which rules out the need to adopt an alternative by itself.

#2 - offense: the biggest offense you have is your affirmative.

Case outweighs – 8 minutes of your 1ac is being indicted, it must be the highlight of your response. Quickly reframe your advantages to clarify why they are still accurate, true, and good. If you win this argument then even in a world where the K is absolutely correct at an impact level your affirmative is still preferable.

Impact turns – for most policy affirmatives, my general rule is to assume that your affirmative links to the criticism. After accepting this looming reality, you should begin to mount a defense of the ideal being indicted (in this case the negative is indicting western epistemology and neoliberal economics, you should respond by defending them). If you win this argument then there is hardly a reason why the K matters.

#3 – solvency deficits

Alternative doesn’t solve the case – seeing that case outweighs is uniformly your best offense to the K, it would be rather difficult for the affirmative to win if the neg alternative was able to solve the aff advantage area. Think of this along the lines of football, the first thing most franchises do is make an expensive payment to a good quarterback, usually the second highest paid person is the tackle on the offensive line who protects said quarterbacks blindside, the logic is similar here. You win debates against K’s because your aff matters and is important, so you have to win secondarily that the alternative doesn’t resolve the aff.

#4 – theory

along the same lines as #3 – theory against the K happens exclusively against the alternative – you are litigating that an alternative (if one ought exist at all) must be held to certain standards to maintain fairness when debating against the plan. This might come in the form of a framework argument about how an alternative can be deployed (for instance: alternatives must be adoptable and weighed as a governmental policy option) or they may just be restrictive (for instance: alternatives cannot result in the plan passing or being fiated), or there may be standards of clarity (for instance: there should be a high standard for the explanation of what an alternative will do in order to compare it to a stable plan).

When advancing this argument you want to frame most of those above questions on whether or not the alternative as deployed is debatable for the aff or if it gives too much leeway to the negative. If it is impossible to imagine what an alternative could/would do and debate about it there are usually problems with being able to compare it to the plan which is the reason to debate it.

Remember, explicitly or implicitly, every theory argument has an interpretation, a violation, and a standard. The interpretation merely describes what the affirmative believes is a beneficial world to debate in, the violation creates the idea that the alternative as debated is contrary to this world and the standard provides the reasons why this is the best possible way to debate. Think of these when writing your theory argument.

#5 – alternative efficacy

This is really a question of whether or not the alternative is capable of resolving its primary claims. Take is as a moment of defense but also a moment of honesty for judges. No judge wants to be in a world where they are determining whether a risk of an extinction is being compared to a likelihood of genocidal violence (and if they do it is because debate has numbed them) the reality is that if voting affirmative the judge would like to know that they are endorsing a probability that although problematic, the aff has a low risk of resulting in calculated violence against groups of people.

This is achieved by questioning how we get from the way the alternative responds to the plan (point A) to some form of uniquely different world than where the status quo is (point B). Although it is often said that kritiks do not have uniqueness, the alternative generates it in some way, your job is to provide reasons why it does not.

#6 – Link minimization

much like in #5 – judges would prefer some minimized result of the aff. For instance, it doesn’t make any intuitive sense to me why someone would just admit “yes, our affirmative is super racist, however, if it resolves the economy it avoids extinction so lets side with racism today.” It is unlikely to spawn much admiration from your judges or ethos against your opponent.

The idea of link minimization is to re-describe the aff advantages in a way that provides some explanation for how they are different than the inherent racism of the status quo order. For instance, it is very easy for a Cuba aff to indicate that the status quo is a harsh form of sanctions to control a government and population while a plan lifting them would allow for a more free form of economic interaction.

### 2ac – framework

Our interpretation is that any alternative the negative endorses must be compared to the affirmative plan as a competing policy alternative enacted through the federal government or the status quo.

This is best for debate because

a) plan focus - focuses the debate as the alternative versus the plan in a way where they can be imagined concretely.

And b) limits – their interpretation creates limitless competing frameworks for debate that jettison debating about the practical application of the alternative versus the plan. The impact is that it nullifies the 1ac completely and negates any ability for the affirmative to defend their research.

There is no link to their offense - This doesn’t limit out any literature bases – any K is possible under our framework but it must be debated as if it can be imagined as a policy or the status quo.

## Affirmative Cards

### Perm – knowledge bridge solvency

**It is important we consider the plan and alternative as a bridge for multiple vantage points of knowledge**

**Bortoluci and Jansen 2013** [Jose ́ H. Bortoluci and Robert S. Jansen Instructor at University of Michigan and Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan TOWARD A POSTCOLONIAL SOCIOLOGY: THE VIEW FROM LATIN AMERICA, Postcolonial Sociology Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, 199–229 Copyright r 2013

For better or worse, many scholars of colonial and post-colonial Latin America – especially social scientists – are put off by postcolonial studies¶ and would hesitate to have their work considered under the heading. The ongoing tendency of much of the interdisciplinary field of postcolonial studies to identify with a strong post-structuralist program (e.g., Mignolo, 2002; Young, 1990) has prompted many social scientists to criticize its lack of sociological depth – or simply to avoid it altogether. At the same time, many in postcolonial studies have remained suspicious of the social sciences, which they frequently accuse of ‘‘positivism’’ and complicity with other ‘‘colonialist’’ modes of knowledge production (e.g., Mignolo, 2002; Spivak, 1988). Yet despite such mutual distrust, we argue that there are resonances between many of the points advanced by postcolonial theorists (at least by those who have not embraced radical deconstructionism) and those suggested by sociologists devoted to the study of post-colonial societies. We propose that it is useful for sociologists to take seriously the critical questions raised by postcolonial studies; but also that postcolonial studies stands to benefit by considering recent social scientific scholarship on post- colonial societies.¶ Our effort to foster conversation between Latin America and other world regions – as well as, inevitably, between the social sciences and the humanities – is complicated by the lack of a common conceptual vocabulary. While not employing an explicit language of ‘‘postcolonialism,’’ many scholars of Latin America have developed analyses and perspectives that are in many ways compatible with those advanced by postcolonial theorists. Thus, in order to foster dialogue, it is necessary to look beyond use of the term ‘‘postcolonial’’ and to focus instead on the ideas and phenomena under consideration. This requires specifying what we mean by a sociologically informed postcolonial perspective.8 We argue that such an intellectual project can be distilled into four main points of analytical emphasis.9

### Perm – middle ground solvency

**The permutation is best – it creates the possibility of combinging with other movements and practices**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

Reform or revolution. This cleavage carries the weight of the tradition of the western left even though it can be found elsewhere, most notably in India. It is the cleavage between those who think that another world is possible, by the gradual transformation of the unjust world in which we live, through legal reform and mechanisms of representative democracy; and those who think that the world we live in is a capitalist world which will never tolerate reforms that will question or disturb its logic of operation and that it must therefore be overthrown and replaced by a socialist world. This is also regarded as a cleavage between moderates and radicals. Either field comprises a wide variety of positions. For instance, among revolutionaries, there is a clear cleavage between the old left, that aspires to a kind of state socialism, the anarchists, that are radically anti-Statist, and some newer left rather ambivalent about the role of the State in a socialist society. Although they amount to a very minor proportion of the WSF, the anarchists are among the fiercest critics of reformism, which they claim controls the WSF’s leadership.¶ This cleavage reverberates, albeit not linearly, in strategic options and options for political action. Among the most salient ones should be counted the strategic option between reforming/democratizing the institutions of neoliberal globalization (WTO and International Financial Institutions) or fighting to eliminate and replace them; and the option for political action between, on the one hand, constructive dialogue and engagement with those institutions, and, on the other, confrontation with them.¶ This cleavage translates itself into opposite positions, either as regards the diagnosis of contemporary societies, or as regards the evaluation of the WSF itself. As to the diagnosis, according to one stance, contemporary societies are viewed as societies where there are multiple discriminations and injustices, not all of them attributable to capitalism. Capitalism, in turn, is not homogeneous, and the struggle must focus on its most exclusionary form – neoliberalism. According to another stance, contemporary societies are viewed as intrinsically unjust and discriminatory because they are capitalist. Capitalism is an enveloping system in which class discrimination feeds on sexual, racial and other kinds of discrimination. Hence, the struggle must focus on capitalism as whole and not against any single one of its manifestations.¶ As to the evaluation of the WSF, the WSF is viewed now as the embryo of an efficacious contestation to neoliberal globalization, for confronting neoliberal globalization at the global scale where more social injustice has been produced, now as a movement which, because it is not grounded on the principle of the class struggle, will accomplish little beyond a few rhetorical changes in dominant capitalist discourse.¶ What is new about the WSF as a political entity is that the majority of the movements and organizations that participate in it do not recognize themselves in these cleavages and refuse to take part in debates about them. There is great resistance to assuming rigidly a given position and even greater to labeling it. The majority of movements and organizations have political experiences in which moments of confrontation alternate or combine with moments of dialogue and engagement, in which long range visions of social change coexist with the tactical possibilities of the political and social conjuncture in which the struggles take place, in which radical denunciations of capitalism do not paralyze the energy for small changes when the big changes are not possible. Above all, for many movements and organizations, this cleavage is westcentric or northcentric, and is more useful to understand the past of the left than its future. Indeed, many movements and organizations do not recognize themselves, for the same reasons, in the dichotomy left and right.

#### We cannot abandon institutional change – the alternative is inflexible to differing conditions of the affirmative – a permutation allows flexibility in praxis

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

On the contrary, the supporters of institutional struggles assume that the “system” is contradictory, a political and social relation where it is possible to fight and where failure is not the only possible outcome. In modernity the State was the center of this system. In the course of the twentieth century the popular classes conquered important institutional spaces, of which the welfare system in the global North is a good manifestation. The fact that the welfare system is now in crisis and the “opening” that it offered the popular classes is now being closed up, does not mean that the process is irreversible. Indeed, it won’t be so if the movements and organizations continue to struggle inside the institutions and the legal system.¶ This cleavage is not spread out at random among the movements that comprise the WSF. In general the stronger movements and organizations are those that more frequently privilege institutional struggles, whereas the less strong are those that more frequently privilege direct action. This cleavage is much livelier among movements and organizations of the North than of the South. The large majority of the movements, however, refuse to take sides in this cleavage. According to them, the concrete legal and political conditions must dictate the kind of struggle to be privileged. Conditions may actually recommend the sequential or simultaneous use of the two kinds of struggle. Historically, direct action was at the genesis of progressive juridico- institutional changes, and it was always necessary to combat the cooptation or even subversion of such changes through direct action.

### Defense of Framework -- focus on politics good

**we must not abandon focused political studies of latin America, their link arguments don’t prove why disregarding the examination of the affirmative is good – we must still focus on the study of the aff¶**

**Bortoluci and Jansen 2013** [Jose ́ H. Bortoluci and Robert S. Jansen Instructor at University of Michigan and Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan TOWARD A POSTCOLONIAL SOCIOLOGY: THE VIEW FROM LATIN AMERICA, Postcolonial Sociology Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, 199–229 Copyright r 2013¶ This article proposes a tentative frame for a creative integration between the social sciences and postcolonial studies, with a particular focus on Latin American societies. Building on earlier strains of Latin American critical thought, the postcolonial scholarship on Latin America has attended to the specificities of the colonial and post-colonial histories of Latin American societies in its engagement with postcolonial theory. It has argued that the analysis and critique of a colonial, Eurocentric imagination should be pushed further back in time, from the 18th to the 16th century – to when Iberian colonial officials first came into contact with the indigenous peoples of Latin America and introduced modern forms of slavery. It has also argued that Latin America is an important site for examining the representational and discursive practices that were developed for and through the operation of early European colonialism. Following this observation, it has shown that – much more than simply fueling the primitive accumulation of capital for European industrialization – Iberian colonialism acted as a proving ground for the development of the modern techniques of control that accompanied capitalist development. Further, Latin American postcolonial scholarship has illustrated how the distinct Latin American colonial experience shaped particular identities on the parts of both Iberian colonizers and colonial subjects in the region. And finally, it has been at the forefront of new attempts to ‘‘decolonize thinking,’’ through the consideration of the distinct historical trajectories of Latin American states and societies. These contributions are themselves incredibly significant and deserve to be taken seriously by postcolonial studies, as well as by other scholars interested in developing a new sociology of colonialism and post- colonialism.¶ But in addition to these advances made by overtly postcolonial strands of Latin Americanist thought, the sociology of Latin America has provided examples of how comparative critical insights might be better incorporated into the social sciences. For more than 60 years, there have been important traditions in sociology (albeit often at the margins of the discipline) that have critiqued modernization theory, worked through the challenges of regional comparison, transnationalism, and historicization, and taken culture quite seriously. These traditions have informed much of the sociological work on Latin America, by Southern and Northern scholars alike. Such work stands to contribute a great deal to a new program of postcolonial sociology – a program that we have made preliminary efforts to sketch here.¶ Finally, this article also suggests a few ways in which a postcolonial sociology might inform new scholarship on Latin America. Substantively, it encourages scholars of cultural politics at the micro-level to attend to the broader social relations and institutions in which these are embedded – both at the national and international levels. Historically, it echoes recent suggestions by Latin Americanist historians and historical sociologists that understanding 19th century structures and events is critical if we want to comprehend adequately the region’s post-colonial historical trajectories. And methodologically, it highlights the usefulness of adopting a compara- tive perspective. This means continuing to compare Latin American countries with those of Europe and North America; but equally important is to compare Latin American with other post-colonial cases, and to pursue innovative comparisons within the region. Overall, the strongest Latin Americanist scholarship has been moving in these directions for some time now. But a reinvigoration and broadening of this effort would go a long way toward the eventual development of a mature program of postcolonial sociology.

### Aff – turn – essentialize the west bad

#### We can’t totalize the knowledge base of the west and modernity – it essentializes the undergoing experiences and makes it impossible to debunk the base of the epistemology

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Perhaps most fundamentally, postcolonial theorists have questioned the automatic and thoroughgoing conflation of modernity with the West (Hall, 1992).10 Traditionally, ‘‘the West’’ has signified a form of life composed of high development, industrialization, urbanization, capitalism, secularity, and modernity (Hall, 1992, p. 277). According to such a view, the ‘‘modernity/non-modernity’’ dyad thus corresponds to a ‘‘West/rest’’ opposition (Sayyid, 2003, pp. 101–102), collapsing space and time to produce an image of a so-called western experience that can then form a basis for further theoretical formulations – not the least of which is a¶ normative master narrative of modernization from which non-western societies represent discouraging deviations (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 29). The consequence of such a theoretical starting point is, of course, that moderni- zation becomes synonymous with westernization (Kaya, 2004, p. 50). Instead, postcolonial theorists have called attention to the fact that this Eurocentric imagination of modernity and westernization is an ideological project – or a discursive formation (Hall, 1992; Said, 1979) – that should be studied in its own right.11 A postcolonial sociology should avoid such theoretical conflation and instead take the resulting ideological formation as an important object of critical social analysis.¶ 2. Provincializing the European experience¶ An immediate consequence of questioning the West/modernity conflation is what Chakrabarty (2000) has referred to as the ‘‘provincialization of Europe.’’ When Eurocentric discourses identify modernity with the West, they in effect provincialize non-western social realities – making them out to be idiosyncratic deviations from an ideal (European) historical standard.12 A postcolonial perspective endeavors to break with the spatiality and temporality of such discourses, simultaneously de-provincializing the histories of post-colonial (and other peripheral) societies while in turn provincializing the European historical experience. More concretely, this means questioning narratives that grant to a supposedly autonomous Europe sole credit for the historical elaboration of ‘‘modern’’ institutions and describing western colonial and post-colonial ‘‘modernization’’ projects as involving some form of – usually precarious – transference. The provinci- alization of Europe thus contributes to a denaturalization of Eurocentric modernization narratives and points instead to the need to understand the historical specificities and interconnectedness of contemporary societies – both central and peripheral.

### Aff Answers to “ports K”

#### No alternative to ports inspection – plan is better than status quo

**Heyman 2004** [Josiah, department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas, El Paso, Ports of Entry as Nodes in the World System, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 11:3, 303-327]

Is there any alternative? As I have written elsewhere, it would be hard to imag- ine an immigration policy that did not involve some form of application, permis- sion, documentation, and inspection. But it does not have to be a border-heavy policy. It could rest on the governance of employers and community conditions in the interior of the United States, an approach that runs counter to current emphases (Heyman 1998b). In this favoring of borders over distributed social governance, there are important clues to the current construction of the world system (so-called “globalization”): there are definite practices of governance that promote and main- tain the locational segregation of people with different life chances and household reproductive trajectories, though such segregation even for the poor is not rigid; the relatively prosperous also carry locationally based identifications, but actual practices of governance allow for low-risk and facile mobility across such lines of locational segregation and the incomplete but substantial border policing powers of nation-states support step-wise changes in the terms of surplus value transfer between classes.

### Aff Answers -- Cuba aff perm solves

#### Cuba is historically situated to combine elements of capitalist and anticapitalist struggles through their social policy. Little risk of an impact for the k, net benefit is the aff

Julie **Mazzei 2012** , Department of Political Science, Kent State University, USA, Negotiating domestic socialism with global capitalism: So-called tourist apartheid in Cuba, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 45, Issues 1–2, March–June 2012, Pages 91–103, In Search of Legitimacy: Post-Soviet De Facto States Between Institutional Stabilization and Political Transformation

¶ The policies constructing the dual economy in Cuba were an attempt at a barrier between socialism and capitalism, akin functionally to a digital “firewall.” Global capitalism was granted regulated entrée inside the country's borders, yet the government intended to keep the capitalist elements outside of its domestic socio-political reality. Thus as with any firewall the policies served as a filter, allowing specific, regulated transactions while prohibiting others. The government permitted interactions in which hard currency was funneled to the state, and regulated or prohibited transactions in which Cuban individuals could capitalistically earn or spend, allegedly limiting capitalist inequities. The “gatekeeper” state erected a firewall.¶ Subsequent reforms, which may seem to introduce elements of capitalism, have been made nonetheless with an eye towards maintaining state control over the economy, a point highlighted by Raúl Castro who, while advocating economic reforms, insists that the economy will continue to be one driven by “[p]lanning, and not free market” ([Castro, 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib18)). As early as 2008, Raúl Castro was openly advocating efficiency in labor practices, insisting that economic reform needed to include “pressure,” which would drive people “to work in order to cover their necessities” rather than rely upon the state “giv[ing] things for free here and there” ([Castro, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib19)). As much as some want to see such reforms as capitalist in nature, in a 2010 speech Castro noted that “modifications that need to be introduced to the updating of the economic model are aimed at the preservation of socialism by strengthening it and making it truly irrevocable” ([Castro, 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib18)).¶ Some of these reforms have included a gradual end to food rations ([Verma, 2011](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib59)); this was part of Castro's move to eliminate inefficiencies in the economy. He argued in 2011 that the ration book “ha[d] become in the course of the years an intolerable burden to the economy and discouraged work” ([Castro, 2011b](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib17)). Similarly, the new economic “Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution” adopted in 2011 ([Castro, 2011a](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib16)) “includ[e] the expansion and easing of labor in the non-public sector” and a disciplined tax structure, in order to improve the “efficiency of the basic means of production,” as Castro put it ([Castro, 2011b](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib17)). However, those who might mistake these for an economic opening are admonished by Raúl Castro, who insists that these reforms are intended to “facilitat[e] the construction of socialism” ([Castro, 2011b](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib17)), not open the system to free market forces. It is a continuation of the reform process intended to maintain state control while also growing the economy. Indeed, Raúl Castro's closing speech at the 6th Party Congress left no doubt about the commitment to socialism, nor about the continuing role of the FAR in that project ([Castro, 2011a](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib16)).¶ In the post-Cold War era of neoliberal economics and globalization, the delicate negotiation between domestic and international economic principles is nearly required of non-capitalist states. The Cuban regime has been able to successfully use the international system, and tourists, to sustain some domestic objectives, but the efforts to do so came at a cost. The fact that Cuba's policies designed to mitigate capitalism-induced inequality seem to have instead facilitated state designed inequity indicates that this negotiation is not an easy one. Nonetheless, if the period since the Cuban Revolution is indicative of anything, it is that the regime will continue to modify in degrees, reforming policies in an attempt to survive and even thrive within the international system while remaining committed to domestic socialism.

### Aff Impact answers -- No Impact – Cuba

#### all historical attempts at foreign neoliberalization have been shortcuited by cuba, no chance plan leads to impact

**Becker 2005** [Ben, party for socialism and liberation Sunday, May 1, 2005 Cuba's economic recovery and socialist gains, <http://www2.pslweb.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11067>

Capitalist governments in the underdeveloped world often celebrate the “dollarization” of their economies. To them, it represents induction into the world economic order. Cuban officials, on the other hand, recognized the long-term structural contradictions caused by introducing dollars into the planned economy, and described the economic adjustments as temporary, but necessary, retreats. Although the Cuban government stepped up its partnerships with foreign capitalist enterprises, the agreements always stipulated governmental control and majority ownership. Cuba rejected western neoliberalism, whereas other countries like Argentina and Ecuador suffered long-term devastating depressions because they submitted to the economic recipes cooked up by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. By 1996, tourism, reorganized agriculture, foreign investment in key industries like nickel and oil exploration and other changes sparked economic growth. The downturn of the “Special Period” was reversed. The value of the national peso increased from 150 per U.S. dollar to 26 per dollar.

### Aff – Cuba : Cuban neoliberalism better than the status quo

#### The Cuban embargo is counterproductive and wastes hundreds of millions of dollars. Neoliberalism offers a better model than status quo blockade

Daniel Hanson, Dayne Batten & Harrison Ealey [Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute.  Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy.  Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst]¶ It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba¶ 1/16/2013 ¶ <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/>

For the first time in more than fifty years, Cuban citizens can travel abroad without permission from their government. The move, part of a broader reform package being phased in by Raul Castro, underscores the irrationality of America’s continuation of a five-decade old embargo.¶ While the embargo has been through several legal iterations in the intervening years, the general tenor of the U.S. position toward Cuba is a hardline not-in-my-backyard approach to communism a la the[Monroe](http://www.forbes.com/places/mi/monroe/) Doctrine. The official position is outdated, hypocritical, and counterproductive.¶ The Cuban embargo was inaugurated by a Kennedy administration executive order in 1960 as a response to the confiscation of American property in Cuba under the newly installed Castro regime. The current incarnation of the embargo – codified primarily in the Helms-Burton Act – aims at producing free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties.¶ Since Fidel Castro abdicated power to his brother Raul in 2008, the government has undertaken more than 300 economic reforms designed to encourage enterprise, and restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal governance, electronics access, and more. Cuba is still a place of oppression and gross human rights abuse, but recent events would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the right direction.¶ Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the [United States](http://www.forbes.com/places/united-states/). At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.¶ At the [Miami](http://www.forbes.com/places/fl/miami/) [International](http://www.forbes.com/international/) Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from [Columbia](http://www.forbes.com/places/sc/columbia/), rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum. At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims.¶ Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges.¶ Yet, estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.

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### A2 they say “economic calculations unethical”

#### Economic calculations are ethical - we requires choices between competing demands – economics creates a system for stabilizing the demands of the Other as preferences, allowing for ethical dialogue through market competition and negotiation

Aasland 2009 [Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66]

What is original in Levinas compared to other authors who also have defined being a human as being related to another human, such as, for instance, Buber and Løgstrup (mentioned in the previous chapter), and those representing the ethics of care (also presented in the previous chapter), is that Levinas acknowledges that I not only meet the Other, but also the third, as the Other. By meeting the third I am again confronted with an appeal for mercy. From this – as a result of an intention of being responsible – I am forced to evaluate, compare, reason and to seek what is just. Justice exerts violence but is still better than injustice. In my efforts towards more justice I must compare, and in this comparing I may have to count, also money; it may even be necessary to set a price for a human life, something that, from the point of view of mercy, is a scandal, but still necessary, because the third is also there. It is necessary to count; the question is why I count. Is it out of my *conatus*, which, if it is allowed to unfold freely without being questioned (or, alternatively, if I ignore the questioning), will lead to violence? Or is it out of mercy, which comes to me as an imperative in the encounter with the Other, and which, in the encounter with the third – as the Other – drives me to seek always more justice? This is not only about counting, it is about being in general – why and how I am. Levinas will insist that “To be or not to be, that is *not* the question” (Cohen in Levinas, 1985: 10). Instead, it is a question of how I am a being together with others in the world. Ethics comes before ontology. An objection to Noddings’ ethics of care is that the mother-infant- situation is not a common one. It is instead a special situation where special qualities are called forth, that are not found elsewhere in society. To believe that the good is natural can be naïve; it can even be dangerous. Looking around in the world today the opposite would be more natural to claim: we have a natural inclination towards controlling and reducing the Other, with violence, physical or psychological. But through the encounter with the Other we are told that this is wrong. It is this small ‘source of the good’ which dominates a mother when she is alone with her infant. At the moment we have to relate to more than one other we understand that we need to make some efforts to understand the situation of the other individuals, their special situations and needs, so that we can know what is just in our dealing with others. It is his discussion of the meeting with the third that makes Levinas’ philosophy so relevant to economy, although most presentations of his philosophy concentrate on the encounter with the Other, and may thus cause the misunderstanding that this is his ethics, and consequently a quite impossible one. However, as mentioned earlier, Levinas’ description of the encounter with the Other is his answer to the question of what is the meaning of ethics, or, why we at all (at least sometimes) want justice. In short, to Levinas, the task of the economy is to contribute to justice. The cause of the striving for justice is the imperative of mercy in the encounter with the Other. And as there is always more than one other my experience of the encounter with the Other cannot be directly transferred to social reality. I must perform a brutal transformation from mercy to justice (but which nevertheless is less brutal than me not caring about justice), and in doing so I need as much as I can possibly acquire of what is available of detailed knowledge of each particular situation, as well as my ability to reason logically. It is not only a fact that ethics is necessary for the economy. Economy is also necessary for ethics. Just as a house may be a concrete security for a loan, the economy is a concrete security for ethics. Without economic goods and needs and the accompanying knowledge for myself, there would have been no need for ethics. An ethics for the other can only be expressed as long as the other has specific needs competing with mine. Only then can I act for the other instead of acting for myself, and thus set the needs of the other before those of me. Or, put in another way: angels do not need ethics, because they have no needs and thus no need to help each other

### A2 they say “neoliberalism bad – structural violence”

#### **No statistical proof for their structural violence claims – dramatic improvements across the board under neoliberalism**

Chen 2000 [Jim Chen, Professor of Law and Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, 2000-2001, University of Minnesota Law School. “PAX MERCATORIA: GLOBALIZATION AS A SECOND CHANCE AT "PEACE FOR OUR TIME"”. November/December 2000. 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 217. Lexis ]

The antiglobalization movement has made some extraordinary claims. Let us transplant a precept of natural science into this social realm: n177 extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof. n178 From Seattle to Prague, protesters have argued that the organs of international economic law conspire with multinational corporations to sap national and local governments of legitimate power, to destabilize global security, and to poison workplaces as well as ecosystems. n179 That case has not met even the most generous standard of proof. The antiglobalization movement has failed to refute the following: Dramatic improvements in welfare at every wealth and income [\*246] level. n180 Since 1820 global wealth has expanded tenfold, thanks largely to technological advances and the erosion of barriers to trade. n181 The world economic order, simply put, is lifting people out of poverty. According to the World Bank, the percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty fell from 28.3 to 23.4% between 1987 and 1998. n182 (The World Bank defines extreme and absolute poverty according to "reference lines set at $ 1 and $ 2 per day" in 1993 terms, adjusted for "the relative purchasing power of currencies across countries.") n183 A more optimistic study has concluded that "the share of the world's population earning less than US$ 2 per day shrank by more than half" between 1980 and 1990, "from 34 to 16.6 percent." n184 In concrete terms, "economic growth associated with globalization" over the course of that decade helped lift 1.4 billion people out of absolute poverty. n185 Whatever its precise magnitude, this improvement in global welfare has taken place because of, not in spite of, flourishing world trade. n186

### Aff Alternative offense: Alternative leads to transition wars

#### **Reversal of neoliberal globalization causes transition wars, terror and disease**

Sachs 1995, [Jeffrey, Prof of International Trade @ Harvard, Consolidating Capitalism, *Foreign Policy* No. 98, questia]

For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point**.** An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work**.** The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?

### Aff Impact Offense -- Neolib good

#### neoliberalism is most ethical because all practical alternatives are worse and cause violence

Richards 2009 [Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, “Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem,” pg. 31-32

Myth no. 1: The Nirvana Myth (contrasting capitalism with **an unrealizable ideal** rather than with its **live alternatives**) But the myth can have subtle effects even if we reject utopian schemes. To avoid its dangers, we have to resist the temptation to compare our live options with an ideal that **we can never realize**. When we ask whether we can build a just society, we need to keep the question nailed to solid ground: just **compared with what?** It doesn’t do anyone any good to tear down a society that is “unjust” compared with the kingdom of God if that society is more just than any of the ones that will replace it. Compared with Nirvana, no real society looks good. Compared with utopia, Stalinist Russia and America at its best will both get bad reviews. The differences between them may seem trivial compared to utopia. That’s one of the grave dangers of utopian thinking: it **blinds us to** the **important differences** among the various ways of ordering society. The Nirvana Myth dazzles the eyes, to the point that the real alternatives all seem like dull and barely distinguishable shades of gray. The free exchange of wages for work in the marketplace starts to look like slavery. Tough competition for market share between companies is confused with theft and survival of the fittest. Banking is confused with usury and exploitation. This shouldn’t surprise us. Of course a modern capitalist society like the United States looks terrible compared with the kingdom of God. But that’s bad moral reasoning. The question isn’t whether capitalism measures up to the kingdom of God. The **question is whether there’s a better alternative** in this life. “Those who condemn the immorality of liberal capitalism do so in comparison with a society of saints that has **never existed**—and **never will**.” —Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works If we’re going to compare modern capitalism with an extreme, we should compare it with a real extreme—like communism in Cambodia, China, or the Soviet Union. Unlike Nirvana, these experiments are well within our power to bring about. They all reveal the **terrible cost** of trying to create a society in which ev- eryone is economically equal. If we insist on comparing live options with live options, modern capitalism could hardly be more different, more just, or more desirable than such an outcome. That doesn’t mean we should rest on our laurels. It means we need to stay focused on **reality rather than romantic ideals**. So how should we answer the question that began this chap- ter: can’t we build a just society? The answer: we should do everything we can to build a more just society and a more just world. And the **worst way to do that** is to try to create an egalitarian utopia.

#### Neolib solves war and collapse causes it – historical evidence and studies prove

Tures 2003 [John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, “ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S”, Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial vol- umes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong gov- ernment can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a pow- erful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totali- tarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other eco- nomically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian “Asian tigers.” A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statis- tical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.

#### Neoliberalism leads to growth and solves poverty – turns your structural violence args

Obhof 2003 [Larry J. Obhof, J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; B.A., Ohio University, 2000. “WHY GLOBALIZATION? A LOOK AT GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND ITS EFFECTS”. University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy. Fall 2003. Lexis.

The effects of globalization have largely been positive for both developed and developing countries. Consider, for example, the effects of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and resulted in agreements to reduce tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. Advanced countries agreed to lower their tariffs by an average of 40%, and [\*99] the signatories agreed to liberalize trade in the important areas of agriculture and clothing. n32 The effects of the Uruguay Round have been both positive and large. Reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers has produced annual increases in global GDP of $ 100-300 billion. n33 This figure is five times larger than the total worldwide aid to developing countries. n34 More importantly, a significant share of this increase has gone to the poorest people. The percentage of the population in developing countries living under $ 1 per day has fallen from 30% to 24% in the past decade. n35 The recent experience of Mexico offers an excellent example of global capitalism in action. The extent of poverty in Mexico is shocking; 20 million people live on less than $ 2 per day. n36 This is so for a number of reasons, including government intervention in the market in the form of protectionist measures intended to help ailing or failing industries. Using government interventions to shape the allocation of resources traditionally led to gross inefficiencies and a low pace of innovation and adoption of new technologies. n37 Trade liberalization has helped curb such interventions - indeed, the opening of its markets has become one of the most important and far-reaching reforms in Mexico. The effects of trade liberalization on the Mexican economy have been significant. Exports in Mexico have increased sixfold since 1985, and the GDP of the country has grown at an average rate of 5.4% per year since 1996. n38 Since NAFTA created a "free trade area" among the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1994, Mexican labor productivity has grown fast in its tradable sectors. n39 Not surprisingly, however, productivity has remained stagnant in nontradable sectors. n40 NAFTA has also improved Mexico's aggregate trade balance and helped to ameliorate the effect of the [\*100] peso crisis on capital flows. n41 As most economists predicted during the NAFTA debate, the effects of the agreement have been positive and large for Mexico. n42 The effects have also been positive, although smaller, for the United States. This is also consistent with the pre-NAFTA analyses of most economists. n43 The positive effects of globalization have been consistent throughout the developing world. Dramatic increases in per capita income have accompanied the expansion of trade in countries that have become more globalized. Korea, for example, has seen average incomes increase eightfold since 1960. n44 China has experienced an average growth of 5.1% during the same period, and other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have experienced faster growth than that in advanced countries. n45 The evidence is incredibly one-sided. "[P]romoting openness, and supporting it with sound domestic policies, leads to faster growth." n46 The most successful third of developing countries have lowered average import tariffs by 34% and increased trade relative to income by 104% since 1980. n47 Per capita income in these countries rose by a yearly average of [\*101] 3.5% in the 1980s, and a yearly average of 5% in the 1990s. n48 The remaining developing countries, which have lowered tariffs by an average of only 11%, experienced "little or no growth in GDP per capita in the post-1980 period." n49 In countries that have become more open, increased growth has undoubtedly been good for the poor. "Cross-country evidence suggests that the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the population increase roughly one-for-one with the average per capita income." n50 Some studies have found an even stronger effect: a 1% increase in the average per capita income is associated with a reduction in poverty rates by up to 3.5%. n51 Poverty rates fall, almost always, simultaneously with growth in average living standards. The evidence is clear: increasing integration leads to greater growth, and with it, greater income levels, particularly for the poorest. n52

### General framing

#### No prior questions- our specific truth claims outweigh.

Owen 2002 [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>

The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Evaluate consequences first – most ethical decision

Isaac 2002 [Jeffery C., Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest.

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much **about unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

1. I have developed these arguments in much greater depth in a draft article submitted to the Review of International Studies “Seeing Latin America: coloniality and the politics of representation in IR”. For the discussant: during that study, I consulted around thirty textbooks focused on a range of topics and aimed at various levels. Of especial relevance were: John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics, 4 ed.,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Antony Best, Jussi Hanhimäki, Joseph A. Maiolo and Kirsten E. Schulze, *An International History of the Twentieth Century,* (London: Routledge, 2003); Michael E. Brown, (ed.), *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the Twentieth Century,* (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Bruno Bueno de Mesquite, *Principles of International Politics, 2 ed*., (Washington: CQ Press, 2000); Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945,* 7 *ed.,* (London: Longman, 2000); John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); K.H.Holsti, *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis, 7 ed.,* (London: Prentice Hall, 1995); Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformations, 8 ed.,* (Boston: Bedford St Martins, 2001); William Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: an International History since 1900,* 5 *ed.,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard Mansbach and Kirsten Rafferty, *Introduction to Global Politics,* (London: Routledge, 2007); Anthony McGrew and Paul Lewis, *Global Politics,* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992); Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, *World Politics: the Menu for Choice, 7 ed.,* (London: Wadsworth, 2004); Trevor Salmon and Mark Imber, (eds.), *Issues in International Relations, 2 ed.,* (London: Routledge, 2008); Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: a Critical Introduction,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000); Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, *International Relations: The Basics,* (London: Routledge, 2007); Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, Kauppi, *IR and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 2 ed.,* (London: Prentice Hall, 2001); Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brian White, Richard Little and Michael Smith, (eds.), *Issues in World Politics,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); John Young and John Kent, *International Relations since 1945: a Global History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). I also made a closer reading of the following more critical texts: J. Marsall Beier, *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair, *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race and Gender,* (London: Routledge, 2004); Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South Relations,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Jenny Edkins and Maya Zehfuss, *Global Politics,* (London: Routledge, 2009; Jim George *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Re-Introduction to International Relations,* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1994); Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference,* (London: Routledge, 2003); Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand and Ricardo D. Salvatore, (eds.), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Sankaran Krishna, *Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century,* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); L.M.H. Ling, *Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Karena Shaw, *Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political,* (London: Routledge, 2008); David Slater, *Geopolitics and the Post-colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, 3 ed,.* (London: Routledge, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Arlene Tickner, ‘Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies’, *International Studies Perspectives*, vol.4, no.4, (2003) pp.325-50. Her large research project confirms the dominance of Western IR: Arlene B. Tickner, ‘Latin America: Still policy dependent after all these years?’, in Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever, (eds), *International Relations Scholarship Around the World,* (London: Routledge, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This is a central tension in Latin American Studies – especially in the USA. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Walter Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp.51-82. Inayatullah and Blaney explain that the figure of the ‘Wild man’ of the Americas was a central metaphor deployed during the intellectual battles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.58-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Danielle VaVaque-Manty “There are Indians in the Museum of Natural History” (*Wicazo Sa Review* Vol.15, No.1, 2000, pp.71-89). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. J. Marshall Beier *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005); Karena Shaw *Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political* (London: Routledge, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Peter d’Errico “Native Americans in America: A Theoretical and Historical Overview” in Frederick E. Hoxie, Peter C. Mancall and James H. Merrell (eds) *American nations: Encounters in Indian Country, 1850 to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Soren C. Larsen “The Future’s past: Politics of Time and Territory among Dakelh First Nations in British Columbia” (Geografiska Annaler: Series B, 88, No.3: 311-321). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For a critique, see: Branwen Gruffydd Jones, ‘Race in the Ontology of International Order’, *Political Studies,* vol.56, (2008), pp.907-927; Robert Vitalis, ‘The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations’, *Millennium,* vol.29, no.2, (2000), pp.331-356. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Mignolo *Idea of Latin America*, pp1-50. See also: David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State,* (Oxford: Blackwells, 2002); Inayatullah and Blaney *International Relations...,* pp.47-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. George Reid Andrews, *Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), map1. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. George Reid Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1800-1900,* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. For example, those of Chinese indentured labour in nineteenth century Peru or South Asian Indians in Guyana. Even more obviously excluded are *mestizos/as* who embody the colonizer/colonized tension. But that is another story. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Aníbal Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America’, Nepantla: Views from the South, vol.1, no.3, (2000), pp.533-580; Walter Mignolo, *Idea of Latin America.* See also Enrique Dussel, *Twenty Theses on Politics,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Laura Lomas, *Translating Empire: Jose Marti, Migrant Latino Subjects, and American Modernities,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Enzo *Faletto Dependency and Development in Latin America* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992; Dussel *Twenty Theses...*; Eduardo Galeano *Las Venas Abiertas de América Latina (*México DF: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971); Ileana Rodriguez, ‘Reading Subalterns Across Texts, Disciplines and Theories: From Representation to Recognition’ in, Ileana Rodriguez, (ed.), *The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp.1-32; Sara Castro-Klaren, ‘Posting Letter: Writing in the Andes and the Paradoxes of the Postcolonial Debate’, in Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel and Carlos A. Jáuregui, (eds), *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), pp.130-157. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. For example, amidst a vast bibliography, Nancy Grey Postero *Now we are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Walter Mignolo *Local Histories/Global Designs*, p.52. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The work of IR scholars Naeem Inayatulla and David Blaney in *International Relations and the Probelm of Difference* (London: Routledge, 2003) complements this work. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Mignolo *Idea of Latin America*, p.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Moraña, Dussel & Jáuregui, ‘Colonialism and its Replicants’, in, *Coloniality at Large,* op.cit., pp.1-20, p.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Darío Aranda, ‘El Otro Bicentenario’, *Pagina 12,* (Buenos Aires: 25/5/2010), <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-146293-2010-05-25.html>, accessed 18/8/2010; Evo Morales, ‘Discurso del Presidente Constitucional de la República Evo Morales Aima’ (La Paz: 22 January 2006), http://www.bolivia.com/Especiales/2006/transmision\_mando/discurso.asp, accessed 11/8/10. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)